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Unbundling Harmonization: Public versus Private Law
Strategies to Globalize Property
Amnon Lehavi*

Abstract
The landscape of supranationalinstitutions is highly diverse) defing a single concept of
globaliZation. Some cross-bordermechanisms aim at coordination, which would streamline the
movement of capital,goods, services, andpersons, but could leave intact a substantiallayer of
local legal ordering. Other supranational instruments aspire to achieve fuller-scale
harmonization,placing more pressure on nationallegal systems to converge. The global web of
bilateralinvestment treaties may be viewed as settlingfor coordination, the European Union as
increasingly seeking harmoniZation, and the European Convention of Human Rights as
currently located in between.
In the context offpropery law, this Article argues that, somewhat counterintuitivey, the
true challenge for supranationalism lies in synchroni,,ing private law doctrines rather than
public law doctrines. Although countries in their soveregn capacities may at times resist
subjecting their local regulatorypowers to constitutional-likesupranationalpropertynorms, they
are often able to employ public law strategies that establish credible systems of cross-state
commitments, while still enjoying a considerablemargin of deference in exercising their sovereign
powers. In contrast, moving toward a global system of private law propery doctrines may
require a deeper commitment tofundamentalchanges in local ordering,implicating core cultural,
social,and economic attributes of nationalsocieties.
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The Article identifies the challenges of devising supranationalpropert normsforprivate
law doctrines, such as retention of title or goodfaith purchase of stolen goods. As a functional
matter, because such doctrines may affect an indefinite number ofparties, many of whom are
not tied by contract and cannot explicity allocate the risks involved with moving across
jurisdictions,the level of unformity required to avoidfrequent legal clashes is much higherthan
that which typtfies public law settings. As a normative matter, any change in private law
doctrines must trickle down to social and cultural mechanisms so that heterogeneous crowds
within and across nationalborders would absorb it-aformidable challengegiven the slow pace
of culturalchange.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The prominent account of globalization is one of a largely bottom-up
phenomenon that nevertheless follows a clear trajectory: undercutting traditional
national borders and exposing the multi-focal, multi-directional spheres within
which human interaction takes place. Jiirgen Habermas identifies it as
the cumulative processes of a worldwide expansion of trade and production,
commodity and financial markets, fashions, the media and computer
programs, news and communications networks, transportation systems and
flows of migration, the risks generated by large-scale technology,
environmental damage and epidemics, as well as organized crime and
terrorism.'
Other fundamentally similar conceptualizations of globalization abound in
the academic and popular literature.2 This emerging conventional wisdom is by
no means naive or utopic, or even one that necessarily endorses globalization or
any of its features (terrorism is but one example). But it does point to
globalization's resilience in moving along a certain course and to the challenges
this poses for societies' long-standing domestic institutions.
Within this analytical framework, legal systems and national top-down
lawmaking institutions are viewed as ones that must catch up with the bottomup social, economic, and technological forces driving globalization. Ignoring
such forces is a luxury that law cannot afford. Responding in an isolated
country-specific manner may prove futile or even detrimental to preserving
worthwhile aspects of globalization. The dynamics of international politics,
along with the willingness and capability of lawmaking institutions to
accommodate globalization, will determine whether the gap between the
bottom-up forces of globalization and top-down legal systems can be narrowed
substantially.
Under this account, states' fears of potentially undermining their sovereign
and local regulatory powers weigh heavily in deciding whether to go global or to
1

JURGEN

2

For a compilation of some

HABERMAS,

ZACHARY

A.

THi; DIvIoDn

WsT 175 (Ciaran Cronin ed. & trans., 2006).

prominent definitions along similar lines, see JUsTIN ERvIN &

SMITH, GLOBALIZATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2-5 (2008).

STAN. J. INT'L L. 283,
285 (2004) (arguing that "[sltates can only govern effectively by actively cooperating with other
states and by collectively reserving the power to intervene in other states' affairs"). This globally
oriented alternative to traditional state sovereignty has not gone unchallenged. See, for example,
JULIAN Ku & JOHN Yoo, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW \WORLD ORDER 19-50 (2012) (arguing that whereas the concept
of "Westphalian sovereignty"-that is, absolute and exclusive control by the state over the
activities within its territory-may become obsolete in the face of globalization, the same does not
hold true, as a normative matter, for the concept of "popular sovereignty," which underlies U.S.
constitutionalism and should accordingly constrain international law overreach by the U.S.).

See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Soveregnty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
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insist on local legal ordering. This is so because, for international conventions,
supranational institutions, or other cross-border instruments to be truly
effective, states must make credible commitments to yield to the authority of the
supranational mechanism, and as rational actors, they would attribute a
particularly high cost to rescinding their sovereign powers.'
This globalization literature does not assume, however, that the
development of legal norms in the global age originates only from states or statemandated supranational institutions. Gunther Teubner points to the
spontaneous, grassroots development of a new body of law that "emerges from
various globalization processes in multiple sectors of civil society independently
of the laws of the nation states."' Most prominent is the contemporary lex
mercatoria, the transnational law of economic transactions, alongside other
practices of private global norm production including the internal legal regimes
of multinational corporations, private lawmaking by labor unions, technical
standardization and professional self-regulation, internet arrangements, or
international rules on sports.6
While the formal status of these privately based global forms of normmaking remains uncertain to national courts, these bottom-up "discourses"
attest to the ability of private actors to adjust their rules to social and economic
global systems. In this respect, globalization and the innovation of global private
lawmaking demonstrate the "power that society, culture and history exert upon
law's empire."'
What picture emerges, explicitly or implicitly, from this account of
globalization and law? Bottom-up forces, led by multiple sectors of civil society
across borders, constantly push toward globalization and its underlying social
and economic system, but states and their top-down institutions may hold back
on such a transition and abstain from legally validating such developments
whenever they fear losing control over their sovereign powers. The types of
lawmaking that do manage to sprout significantly in this state of affairs are ones
created by private entities-the new lex mercatoria and other forms of private
ordering. Accordingly, the corresponding private law fields could more easily
4

See, for example, Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of InternationalInstitutions, 55 INT'L
ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (arguing that "states use international institutions to further their own goals,
and they design institutions accordingly," and that international institutions should be understood
as "explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or
authorize behavior").

5

Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukonina": Legal Pluralismin the World Sodely, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT
ASTATiC 3, 4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).

6

See Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 Am.
COMP. L. 149,156-59 (1997).

7

Id. at 165.
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move toward harmonization if provided proper support by states and
supranational institutions.
This Article sets out to question these assumptions, focusing on property
law. Some of the arguments against this conventional wisdom rely on the unique
traits of property law, while other insights may have broader applicability in
analyzing the globalization of law.
First, this Article shows that the choice between globalization and localism
is far from binary, meaning that states, organizations, and individuals may
endorse some types of cross-border institutional frameworks for the legal
ordering of property while shunning others, and that such choices may have
normative merits beyond political strategies. Any attempt to switch from
national ordering to supranationalism or to calibrate the specific degree of
convergence must rely on some type of cost-benefit analysis. Different property
issues may call for different models along a local/global continuum.
Against this binary conception, I emphasize the continuum of
supranationalism, which refers not only to the number of participants in a
certain cross-border arrangement-with bilateral agreements or regional
institutions often proving more effective than attempts at wholesale
globalization-but also to the substantive scope of collaboration. Some crossborder mechanisms may be viewed as aiming at coordinaion-attaininga certain
threshold of coordinating expectations among countries to streamline the
movement of capital, goods, services, and persons, but also leaving intact room
for a substantial layer of local legal ordering.' Other supranational instruments
aspire for fuller-scale social, economic, or political harmoniZation-cross-border
unification of legal norms-placing more pressure on national property systems
to converge. The global web of bilateral investment treaties can be seen as
settling for coordination in protecting the property rights of investors, and the
twenty-eight-member European Union as increasingly seeking harmonization in
the various aspects of property law, with the forty-seven-member European

8

The term "coordination" is used regularly in the academic literature, bearing somewhat different
meanings at times. Game theory is a prominent field coloring this context. See, for example,
RANDAL C. PICKER, AN INTRODUCTION To GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 13 (1994) (defining a
"coordination game" as one in which the parties have slightly differentiated preferences but "care
most about making the same decision") (emphasis added). In the context of international legal
relations, Richard Buxbaum has referred to "coordination" as including non-hierarchical
cooperation among countries manifested in the "adaptation of a state's laws to those of another
formally equal state." Richard M. Buxbaum, Comsparative Law as a Bridge Between the Nation-State and
the GlobalEconomy: An Essay for Herbert Bernstein, 1 DuKE L. CICLOPs 63, 67-68 (2009). While I
share Buxbaum's view of coordination as a non-hierarchical form of cooperation, my use of the
term also delineates the scope of substantive reciprocal adaptation of laws as, in essence,
significant but short of full-scale unification.
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention)' currently located in between.
Second, contrary to the assumption that globalizing private law is generally
easier than globalizing public law because private parties across borders derive
uniformity largely from private lawmaking and other bottom-up actions, I argue
that the true challenge for any major shift beyond mere coordination toward
harmonization of property law lies in synchronizing private law doctrines rather
than public law doctrines. While it is true that states as sovereigns may at times
resist subjecting their local regulatory powers to constitutional-like supranational
property norms, they are often able to employ public law strategies that establish
credible systems of reciprocal cross-state collaboration while still enjoying a
considerable margin of deference in exercising their sovereign powers. In
contrast, moving toward a unified system of private law property doctrines to
facilitate harmonization requires a deeper commitment to fundamental changes
in local ordering, implicating the core cultural, social, and economic attributes of
societies-a commitment that nations may find difficult to make.
Third, the Article shows that the challenges of devising supranational
norms for private property law doctrines are embedded in both functional and
normative considerations that do not apply equally to public law doctrines, even
if we otherwise think that the borders between public and private in property are
not always clear-cut. As a functional matter, given the in rem nature of property
rights and the fact that private law doctrines may implicate an indefinite number
of private parties-many of whom are not tied by contract and cannot otherwise
explicitly allocate the risks involved with moving across jurisdictions-I argue
that the level of uniformity of norms required to avoid frequent legal clashes is
much higher than that which typifies public law settings, where the dispute
typically involves the plaintiff and a distinct domestic government.
As a normative matter, however, any change in a private law property
doctrine, which by definition implicates the everyday dealings of ordinary private
parties, must trickle down to social and cultural mechanisms. This is required so
that the new norm is absorbed and practically exercised by broad-based
heterogeneous crowds both within and across national borders, not only as a
top-down dictate but also as a social and cultural convention. Obviously, public
law concepts such as "public interest," "expropriation," "proportionality," and
"fair balance" are deeply embedded in values and normative inclinations, as part
of the broader inherent ties between domestic constitutional law and underlying

9

Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/005.htm [hereinafter European Convention].
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national values.o But changes to public law concepts to accommodate
supranational standards need to be adopted chiefly by the state authorities that
implement them and would find the transition smoother if allowed a domestic
"margin of appreciation" in doing so." Things are different with grassroots
observance of norms such as "fair dealing" or "good faith." Since popular
cultural orientations and social beliefs about modes of interpersonal conduct
may change relatively slowly over time, domestic private law doctrines may be
more resistant to harmonization than typically envisioned by globalization
theorists.
The Article is structured as follows. Section II starts by pointing to the
complex ways in which states, international organizations, and private entities
interact to create a multilayered system of regulation and legal ordering. It
introduces current attempts to quantify globalization through measures of crossborder openness and assimilation, while also discussing a different ideal of
globalism, one that embraces pluralism and hybridity. This section then
identifies the spectrum of supranational collaboration, which is defined at the
poles by coordination and harmonization. It considers three prominent
supranational mechanisms that implicate property: (1) bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), which set substantive and procedural legal norms for the
protection of foreign investment; (2) the European Convention, and in
particular Article 1 of the First Protocol dealing with the protection of
property;12 and (3) the European Union (EU), which started out as a limited-inscope common market and evolved toward broader economic and political
integration. These mechanisms are located at different points along the
coordination-harmonization spectrum, with each such configuration creating, in
turn, a distinct set of legal challenges.
Section III studies the unique traits of property as embedded in both
public and private law and the implications that this duality has for supranational
property mechanisms. Identifying property's structural traits of in rem
applicability and practical constraints on opting out for private ordering, this
section discusses how these structural features function differently in private

10

For a prominent account of the challenges of accommodating domestic constitutional law
systems to the age of globalization, in view of the deeply entrenched political and ideological basis
of

constitutional

law,

see

VICKI

C.

JACKSON,

CONSTITUTIONAL.

ENGAGEMENT

IN

A

TRANSNATIONAL ERA 17-38 (2010).

11

12

As originally used by the Council of Europe, "[t]he term 'margin of appreciation' refers to the
space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities, in
fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights." Council of
Europe, The MaTgin of Appreciation, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/
Themis/ECHR/Paper2 en.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
European Convention, supra note 9, Protocol 1 art. 1.
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versus public law. It then returns to the public law context, arguing that
countries can coordinate expectations in defining and calibrating key legal
concepts while taking upon themselves constitutional-type duties without being
committed to full-scale uniformity of laws.
Section IV considers how cross-border property norms evolve, analyzing
the quest for harmonization in the private law context. It starts by unfolding the
unique challenges-both functional and normative-facing any attempt to
converge national private law property doctrines. As a functional matter, the "in
rem essentiality" of property rights mandates the establishment of a single
ranking of legal powers and priorities with regard to a certain asset, such as land,
and thus requires a high degree of cross-border uniformity. From a normative
perspective, however, supranational laws that seek to redirect the actions of
individuals across borders must recognize, in addition to the formal rules, the
grassroots cultural and social attributes that play a key role in practically
governing interpersonal dealings. This means that, while the functional features
of private property law generally require harmonization for supranational
mechanisms to be sustainable, such an ambitious endeavor often faces
particularly intricate challenges because of the idiosyncratic normative and
cultural attributes of domestic doctrines. Finally, this section reviews the current
landscape of cross-border private law property norms. It examines, in turn, the
limited success of theme-specific international conventions, the approach taken
by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the European
Convention's property clause in private disputes, and the strategies employed by
the EU to promote integration in private law doctrines through "positive
supranationalism": the enactment of EU regulations, directives, and decisions.
II. GLOBALIZATION: BETWEEN COORDINATION
AND HARMONIZATION
A. Turning Socioeconomic Trends into Legal Constructs
Habermas's conception of globalization, presented in Section I, does not in
itself identify the prominent media through which "the cumulative processes of
a worldwide expansion"" occur-that is, whether globalization as a social,
economic, and technological phenomenon is chiefly the result of top-down
initiatives by states and authorized interstate organizations; a bottom-up process
initiated by the dispersed actions of individuals, corporations, and nonprofit
organizations; or a combination of such forces. Clearly, some of the mechanisms
identified with globalization are the result of political negotiations or power

13

HABERMAS, supra note 1,
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plays among states or other official bodies. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is an example of a "rules-based, member-driven organization"14 that has
expanded well beyond the promotion and enforcement of cross-border state
commitments on trade and tariffs to administer the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-perhaps the most extensive
cross-border, state-based collaboration instrument dealing with property law."
Other major developments, however, have proceeded from the bottom up.
In light of the cumulative globalizing effect of the indefinite number of crossborder transactions in goods, services, capital, and so forth, and the tremendous
impact that multinational corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Apple
have had on the social, economic, and technological aspects of globalization,"
certain private organizations have taken on a more robust role as cross-border
regulators. This is the case, for example, with the privately based International
Chamber of Commerce (CCI, to use the French acronym), which tasks itself
with promoting "international trade, services and investment."" More broadly,
as Sabino Cassese notes, the approximately 2000 "global regulatory regimes" are
run by bodies as diverse as formal international organizations, transnational
networks of officials, hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements, and
private institutions.' The result is a "marbled" space in which the global,
transnational, and national are intermixed."
Current attempts to quantitatively analyze globalization also point to both
bottom-up and top-down forces as potential facilitators of globalization
processes. The Swiss-based KOF Index of Globalization measures the extent of
globalization in countries along three dimensions: economic, social, and
political.2 0 The economic aspect refers to both actual capital flows and domestic
regulation that may restrict such flows.2 1 The social globalization measure is
VfO,

14

World Trade Organization, About
(last visited Oct. 26, 2014).

15

See infra Section IV.B.1 (analyzing TRIPS).
See, for example, Michele Rioux, Multinational Corporationsin Transnational Networks: Theoretical and
Regulator Challenges in Historical Perspective, 2014 OPEN J. Pot. SCL 109 (analyzing the complex
interplay between such corporations, states, and networks in the globalized economy).

16

http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/thewto-e.htm

17

Sabino Cassese, The Global Polity, in DEMOKRATIE-PERSPEKTIVEN: FESTSCHRIFT FOR BRUN-OTro
BRYDE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 511, 514 (Michael Bdiuerle et al. eds., 2013) (citing the preamble of
the International Chamber of Commerce Constitution).

18

See id. at 512.

19

See id. at 516-19.

20

See

21

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, KOF Index of GlobaliZation,
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
Flows are measured by the scope of trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and
income payment to foreign nationals. State measures include import barriers, tariffs, taxes, and
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based on data about personal contact, information flows, and cultural
proximity.2 The political subindex relies on formal international ties and
affiliations of states.
These features highlight the complexity and multi-directionality of practices
and institutions implicating globalization. Bottom-up attributes, such as cultural
orientations and preferences, can foster but also hinder supranationalism, just as
top-down political initiatives and subsequent legal instruments can have a
significant stimulating effect on globalization trends. Accordingly, it would be
wrong to view legal systems as always trailing social, economic, and
technological drivers of globalization or as otherwise possessing an inherently
conservative or parochial character. It is true that law at times follows grassroots
drivers of change. But this is far from identifying a single pattern for law and
supranational legal orders in particular. Top-down institutions and legal
mechanisms may play a key role in prompting a supranational socioeconomic
environment, such as in the context of the EU.24
Moreover, the choice between globalization and localism is far from binary,
meaning that states, organizations, corporations, and individuals may endorse
some types of cross-border institutional frameworks while shunning others. This
continuum refers not only to the number of participants in a certain crossborder arrangement-with bilateral agreements or regional institutions often
proving more effective than attempts at wholesale globalization-but also to the
substantive scope of collaboration, moving along numerous potential points on
the coordination-harmonization axis. As the next section demonstrates, such a
choice does not necessarily reflect a compromise or what parties view as a
second-best solution to wholesale globalization. An intermediate cross-border
regulatory or legal collaboration mechanism, in calibrating the optimal scope of
supranational ordering, may, and often does, express both bottom-up and topdown preferences. Such an arrangement may also reflect a nuanced approach
toward globalization, one observing the costs and benefits of different degrees
of convergence-for instance, putting more weight on harmonization where the

capital account restrictions. See Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, 2014 KOF Index of
Globai adon Variables and Weights, http://globahzation.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer-public/2014/
04/15/variables_2014.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
22

23

24

These three features include, respectively: telephone traffic, tourism, foreign population, and
international letters; internet users, television, and trade in newspapers; and number of
McDonald's restaurants, number of Ikea stores, and trade in books. See id.
This subindex measures membership in international organizations, participation in UN Security
Council missions, the number of embassies within a state, and international treaties. See id.

See infra Section II.B.3.
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cross-border functionality of a certain field of property calls for unification but
settling for coordination where the costs of differentiation tend to be smaller.25
Such a choice also ties in with broader normative dilemmas about the
scope of legal pluralism that a supranational framework could accommodate. It
seems obvious that sameness or proximity across borders streamlines
supranational institutional frameworks, but the result should not be an all-ornothing approach by which countries, to collaborate, must seek universal
harmonization of their legal systems.
Some authors, such as Paul Schiff Berman, even point to global legal
pluralism as a self-standing value, so that supranational institutions may
"deliberately seek to create or preserve spaces for productive interaction among
multiple, overlapping legal systems by developing procedural mechanisms,
institutions, and practices that aim to manage, without eliminating, the legal
pluralism we see around us."26 Yet even if one does not adhere to such an
idealistic view of pluralism but rather recognizes it as a potential constraint, this
does not imply that supranational collaboration can follow only one optimal
model-with localism the only alternative. The three mechanisms analyzed in
the next section demonstrate how supranationalism should be understood: as
comprising various models along a coordination-harmonization continuum.
B. Supranational Institutions along the CoordinationHarmonization Axis
1. BITs as credible coordination.
International investment treaties, prominently taking the form of BITs,
represent one the most remarkable developments in international economic law.
BITs currently number over 2900 worldwide, following a dramatic rise in the
early 1990s.2 ' BITs tie together not only developed-developing country dyads,
but also pairs of developing or transitional countries as well as developed
country dyads. Virtually every country in the world is now party to at least one

26

Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72 (2005)
(pointing to the potential benefits of differentiated state-level property law regimes within the
U.S. federal system, including promoting competition among jurisdictions and innovation). The
functional debate about the optimal level of convergence in federal systems touches on many
other fields, such as environmental regulation. See generaly Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2341 (1996) (offering a new approach to
addressing interstate externalities through federal environmental regulation).
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL. PLURAILISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS

27

See UNITED NATIONS

25

10 (2012). See also Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. Rav. L & Soc. Sci. 243 (2009).
INVESTMENT

CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

(UNCTAD), WORLD
114, available at
UNCTAD WIR 2014].

REPORT 2014: INVESTING IN THE SDGs: AN ACTION PIAN

http://unctad.org/en/Publicationslibrary/wir201 4en.pdf
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BIT. As of 2013, both Germany and China were counterpart to at least 130
BITs. 28 Recent developments point to the rise of regionalism in treaty making (in
Southeast Asia and Central America, for example) and to the inclusion of
investments within broader-based free trade agreements, but BITs remain the
most prevalent form of international investment agreements.2 9
The history and evolution of BITs have been analyzed extensively in the
literature, with various theories offered to account for the motivations of states
in entering into and implementing such bilateral arrangements.30 Briefly, the first
BIT is commonly traced to the agreement signed in 1959 between Germany and
Pakistan amid the aftermath of colonialism. During the 1950s, a number of
newly independent developing countries embarked on a series of massive
expropriations of assets and enterprises that had been funded and owned by
foreign investors
from Western economies. 1
Nationalizations
and
expropriations have been a recurring theme in international investment, reaching
another peak during the 1970s 3 2-and never truly disappearing to this day.33
This trend seems to have been not merely opportunistic but also based on
ideology. Developing and socialist countries explicitly promoted a political
platform that would recognize the right to expropriate foreign assets. In two
1974 declaratory statements, the UN General Assembly held that states'
sovereignty includes "the right of nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals" and, shortly thereafter, the right "[t]o nationalize, expropriate or

2s

See id. at 223-24.

29

See id. at 114; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARD A Niw GENERATION OF
INVESTMENT POLICIES xvi-xvii, available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTADWIR2012-Full-en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD WIR 20121.
See, for example, Asha Kaushal, Revisiting HistoU: How the Past Mattersfor the Present Backlash Against
the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARv. INT'l L.J. 491, 499-504 (2009); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A
Brief Histoy of InternationalInvestment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'i L. & Po'xY 157 (2005);
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 71-79 (2005); PETER T.

30

MUcHLINsKI, MULTINATIONAi. ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 628-35 (2d ed. 2007).

31

32

33

For example, Iran expropriated British petroleum assets in 1951, Libya expropriated joint LibyanAmerican petroleum assets in 1955, Egypt nationalized the Anglo-French-owned Suez Canal in
1956, and Cuba nationalized an array of foreign assets in 1959. See Amnon Lehavi & Amir N.
Licht, BITs and Pieces of Property,36 YALE J. INT'L. L. 115, 120 (2011).
The UN identified 875 distinct governmental takeovers of foreign property in 62 countries during
the period between 1960 and 1974. See Don C. Piper, New Directions in the Protection ofAmericanOwned Propert Abroad, 4 INT'i TRADE L.J. 315, 330 (1979).
For a detailed account of a recent and colossal expropriation by Chad, notwithstanding the
involvement of the World Bank, see generally Scott Pegg, Chronicle ofa Death Foretold: The Collapse
ofthe Chad-CameroonPipeline Project, 108 AFR. AFF. 311 (2009).
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transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation
should be paid by the State adopting such measures." 34
Apparent UN policy, then, pushed developed countries to seek alternative
mechanisms to protect investments made by their residents abroad. As Kenneth
Vandevelde notes, during this era BITs were negotiated principally between a
developed and a developing country; often, "the agreement was drafted by the
developed country and offered to the developing country for signature, with the
final agreement reflecting only minor changes from the original draft. This
persistent pattern added an ideological dimension to the agreements."
Despite the slow start, the number of BITs grew from a handful to a few
dozen each year following a series of key events-notably, the debt crisis of
developing countries in the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989and in response to the advancement of a neoliberal policy by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank and IMF's
neoliberal policy focused on implementing market-oriented structural reforms
within developing countries as a condition for aid, paying particular attention to
the protection of property rights. As a corollary, the attitude toward foreign
direct investment (FDI) has changed from hostility to hospitality." In the 1990s
and early 2000s, some leading capital-exporting countries, including the U.S., the
U.K., Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, sought to solidify their control over
the terms of engagement in FDI by each introducing its own version of a
"model BIT."3 7
The current scope of BITs extends, however, well beyond the paradigm of
a developed, capital-exporting country conditioning the flow of FDI into a
capital-dependent developing country on signing a BIT. First, capital is
increasingly flowing from East to West and South to North through sovereign
wealth funds, government subsidiaries, and corporations based in China, Brazil,
Russia, and the Persian Gulf countries. 38 This means that many BITs now
34

Vandevelde, supra note 30, at 167-68 (internal citations omitted).

35

Id. at 170-71.

36

See Lorraine Eden et al., From the Obsolescing Bargain to the Political Bargaining Model, in
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 251 (Robert
Grosse ed., 2005); see also Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital The Diffusion of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 833 (2006) (suggesting that entering BITs is
often at least implicitly expected of developing economies in order to receive IMF funding).

37

For analyses of model BIT provisions, see generally OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS (2008).

38

See Steven Weisman, A Fear of Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21 /business/worldbusiness/21wealth.html?pagewanted= all
(describing growing fears in the U.S. over multi-billion dollar foreign investments from sovereign
wealth funds in China, Russia, and Persian Gulf countries, and quoting American officials'
concerns that these funds are politically influenced and have opaque investment policies).
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possess a more reciprocal nature not only formally but also practically. Second,
China and other emerging economies are investing massively in Africa and Latin
America, to the point that the U.S. has warned African countries of the perils of
"new colonialism," 39 and Brazil-itself investing heavily in other developing
countries-has tried to narrow the impact of Chinese investment within its own
territory.40 Finally, as noted above, developed countries, and especially
neighboring countries, are now signing BITs between themselves, as is also the
case among dyads of developing economies.4
But while it may seem that all countries are simply riding the wave of BITs,
it should be clear that, because BITs involve a credible set of commitments that
may impinge on parties' sovereignty-as I will now show-countries who join
BITs carefully weigh the potential implications of such treaties. Consider China
and Brazil again: China has used BITs extensively both to improve its reputation
among Western investors and to protect its own investors abroad, whereas
Brazil has generally declined to sign new BITs out of concerns about sovereignty
and remaining attractive to FDI.4 2
What are the mechanisms that turn BITs into a system of credible
commitments? BITs typically implement three credibility-related measures: (1) a
commitment by host countries to a certain set of substantive standards of
treatment for foreign investment; (2) a direct right of action for investors against
host countries for an alleged breach of these commitments; and (3) resolution of
disputes by international arbitration, most often in the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).43
The substantive commitments states undertake in BITs typically include
the duties of national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, and guarantees of compensation with respect to
expropriation (direct or indirect), alongside other commitments such as freedom
of capital movements and prohibitions against imposing certain requirements on

39

Clinton Warns Against 'New Colonialism" in Africa, REUTERS (June 11, 2011, 1:09 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/11/us-clinton-africa-idUSTRE75A0RI20110611
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2014).

4

See Alexei Barrionuevo, China's Interest in Farmland Makes Bragil Uneasy, N.Y. TIMis, May 27, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/mericas/27brazil.html?pagewanted=
all.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.

41
42

See Dan Wei, Bilateral Investment Treaties: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Practices of Bragil and China, 33
EUR.J. L. & ECON. 663, 684-87 (2012).

43

ICSID is by far the most popular arbitration framework for BIT disputes. A distant second is the
arbitration framework developed by UNCITRAL, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Towards the Multilateraligation of International
InvestmentLaw, 10J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 865, 875-77 (2009).
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foreign investors.' The term "investment" is typically defined as comprising a
list of rights in the following assets: immovable, movable, and intangible
property; intellectual property; shares, stocks, options, and other derivatives;
licenses and permits; related property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and
pledges; and, in some cases, even claims to debts.45 Consequently, BIT
jurisprudence has gradually shifted toward a "property discourse," focusing on
investors' property rights as the subject of legal protection and balancing them
against states' legislative and regulatory powers, while also borrowing from the
property jurisprudence of the European Convention, the U.S. Constitution, and
other legal instruments.4 6
As for the direct right of action and international arbitration, recent years
have seen a dramatic growth in the number of cases brought before ICSID and
other tribunals. By the end of 2012, the total number of known treaty-based
cases stood at 518, with a record sixty-two new disputes filed during 2012.
Ninety-five countries have been sued at least once in such proceedings. Four
Latin American states lead the list (Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico),
followed by the Czech Republic and Canada. Recent data points also to
investors' significant success rates in litigating these disputes. In 2012, seventy
percent of publicly available decisions addressing the merits of the disputes
accepted investors' claims at least in part, with that year seeing also the highest
compensation award in the history of BITs: a $1.77 billion judgment against
Ecuador following its unilateral termination of an oil contract.4 7
BITs, therefore, may carry substantial implications for states, impinging on
their sovereignty in designing domestic legislative and regulatory policy and
potentially resulting in major financial awards for breaches of obligations toward
investors. Although during earlier periods of foreign investment and under
earlier BITs, several scholars embraced the "obsolescing bargaining theory"-by
which developing countries initially accept terms required by foreign
multinational corporations as a condition for investment only with the purpose
of "obsolescing" the bargain once it has been struck and investments sunk 4 8-it
44

See UNCTAD WIR 2012, supra note 29, at 109.

45

See, for example, Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Federal Republic of
Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 2-3, Dec. 1, 2003,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/736.
See Amnon Lehavi, The Global Lax of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 425, 447-51 (2010); Lehavi &
Licht, supra note 31, at 128-32.

6

47

See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), May 2013, at 19, available
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD
ISDS].

48

See RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISEs 47-53 (1971); see also THEODORE H. MORAN, MUITINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
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seems less likely that states would be able to rely on such a strategy with the
current explosion of BIT disputes and arbitral awards. While states may attempt
to avoid liability by identifying the legal thresholds that allow them to reshape
the regulatory framework applying to the investment, it is clear by now that
BITs do subject states to a set of credible commitments.4 9
Despite the growing pressures that BITs exert on local sovereignty, states
have generally refrained from unilaterally rescinding specific BITs or entirely
opting out of the system." In a considerable number of instances, however,
states have renegotiated BITs, especially when convinced that an over-expansive
interpretation of treaty terms may be undercutting domestic legislative and
regulatory powers." In 2001, in light of their concern over tribunals'
interpretations of the standards of treatment and expropriation in particular, the
trade ministers of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico offered a joint interpretation to
key provisions in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which concerns the protection of investments. 52
Moreover, while the structure of international investment arbitration
tribunals, including ICSID, is ad hoc-without a formal principle of
precedent 5 3-these tribunals have increasingly referred to previous investment
arbitration cases in order to consolidate the interpretation of typical procedural
and substantive provisions in BITs.5 4 This emerging body of law has thus gone
THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE 9 (1974); Stephen J. Kobrin, Expropriation as an
Attempt to Contrv Forign Firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960 to 1979, 28 INT'l STUD. Q. 329, 342
(1984).

49

so

On the centrality of institutions as commitment mechanisms, see Douglass C. North & Barry R.
Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Centug England, 49 J. EcoN. HIST. 803, 808 (1989). On institutional commitment
mechanisms in international investment, see generally Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional
Environment for Multinational Investment, 16 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 334 (2000); Witold J. Henisz &
Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organiation-Within and Between Countries, I Bus. &
Pot. 261 (1999).
Ecuador has been a notable exception, rescinding nine BITs (mainly with Latin American
counterparts). See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in InternationalInvestment Agreements (2008-June
2009), U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8
(2009), at 6, available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Recent Developments
20091; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT

AND
TRADE
FOR
DEVELOPMENT
PublicationsLibrary/wir2013 en.pdf.
s'
52
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108,

available

at

http://www.unctad.org/en/

See UNCTAD Recent Developments 2009, supra note 50, at 5-6.
See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July
31,
2001), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topicsdomaines/disp-diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx.
See Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603, 642-44 (2012).
See SANTIAGO MONTr, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 106-07 (2009). For a
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well beyond customary international law to create a system of supranational
norms concerning the proper balance between protection of investors' property
rights and preservation of domestic sovereign powers, one that is increasingly
referred to as establishing supranational or even global constitutional law with
regard to international investments."
I would suggest, however, that even under this broader view of BIT
jurisprudence, it would be wrong to conclude that states have explicitly or
implicitly embraced an idea of harmonization of their public or constitutional
laws on property. As I will show in more detail in Section III by focusing on two
BIT provisions that have played a prominent role in the development of BIT
jurisprudence-expropriation (direct or indirect) and fair and equitable
treatment-the overarching legal regime that seems to have developed is one of
coordination. This means that states gradually embrace a common threshold
with respect to core cases of infringement of property rights and procedures
affecting legislative and regulatory changes, but they otherwise maintain
significant leeway in designing their domestic policies. In this respect, the
coordination embedded in BIT jurisprudence should be understood as creating a
legal environment that seeks to align the reasonable expectations of investors
and states, while remaining clear that foreign investors are otherwise subjected
to the legal regime of the host state.
Moreover, a key aspect of property law that is entirely left out of BIT
jurisprudence is that of private law doctrines. The commitments entailed in
BITs, at least as interpreted by arbitral tribunals as of now, concern only duties
of states in exercising legislative and regulatory powers in their own relations visit-vis individuals. These provisions do not refer to legal relations among private
persons in regard to property rights, meaning that the foreign investor remains
subject to domestic lawmaking on private law matters. As I suggest in the
following sections, in view of the complex public-private interplay in property,
significant implications for the congruence of property's public aspects follow
from private law jurisprudence remaining entirely outside the scope of BITs.
States thus do not undertake a commitment to uniformity by exercising their
sovereign powers in either private or public aspects of property, although they
may certainly be held accountable-through the payment of monetary awards-

discussion of the fair and equitable standard in current arbitral awards, featuring references to
earlier cases but also a certain measure of diversity, see UNCTAD ISDS, supra note 47, at 12-14.
This example is discussed further infra Section III.B.1.
ss

See, for example, MONrr, supra note 54, at 12-17; Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation?On the
Literatureand Sociology of InternationalInvestment Law, 22 EUR.J. INT'L L. 875, 899-902 (2011); see also
Peter Behrens, Towards the ConstitutionaliZation of International Investment Protection, 45 ARCHIV DES
VOILKERRECHTS 153 (2007).
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for breaching their BIT commitments to investors in coordinating certain
standards of public conduct.
2. The European Convention of Human Rights as common ground.
The evolution of the European Convention and the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) is often depicted as one of the most incredible
phenomena in the history of international law." The discussion of the European
Convention throughout this Article will focus on the right to property as
articulated in Article 1 of the First Protocol, and will generally refrain from
overarching arguments about the scope of coverage and level of state
commitment with regard to the entire array of human rights protected in the
Convention.
The chief argument I make in this context is that the Convention, as
interpreted by the ECHR, constructs an intermediate level of commitment by
states to subject their domestic property lawmaking to supranational principles
that focus on assuring "fair balance" and "proportionality" in the deprivation or
regulation of property-while entrusting states with a broad margin of
appreciation in setting forth both ends and means. Also, although the ECHR
has taken on cases that were essentially private law disputes, it has expressed a
particularly deferential approach toward the state-based ordering of such private
legal relations.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the initial ambition of the
European Convention's proponents was to institute a scheme that would act as
a type of alarm for democratic European countries seeking to protect themselves
against the rise of totalitarian regimes and attendant large-scale violations of
human rights." At first, the Convention's clauses recognizing court jurisdiction
and the individual right to petition were only optional for signatory states. The
common justification for this was that the Convention's ratification was merely
"an act of pan-European solidarity" by members of the Council of Europe
(established in 1949), as the members' national courts already had been fulfilling
the task of protecting human rights.ss Thus, when the court was set up in 1959,
it had jurisdiction over only a few states and handled a limited number of cases."

56

See, for example, Michael O'Boyle, On Reforming the Operation of the European Court of Human Rights, 1
EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 1 (2008).

57

See ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ITS
INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5-8 (2010).
Luzius Wildhaber, Changing Ideas about the Tasks of the European Court of Human Rights, in THEl

58

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1998-2006: HISTORY, ACHIEVEMENTS,

(2006).
59

See BATES, supra note 57, at 11.
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The 1970s marked a turning point for the Convention, with the European
Commission of Human Rights-a quasi-judicial body tasked with receiving and
sorting all petitions submitted under the Convention-approving more cases for
court hearings; in addition, the ECHR issued a number of key decisions on the
right of access to the court and outlined principles for the application and
interpretation of the Convention."o It was then that the Convention's paradigm
changed. No longer concerned with large-scale, flagrant violations of human
rights, the ECHR began to develop a "European Bill of Rights" with regard to
the types of civil liberty issues regularly adjudicated by national constitutional
supreme courts, and many states amended their domestic laws in response to the
ECHR pronouncements. Thus was a European standard of human rights
protection added to the states' domestic systems of law, providing a mechanism
for individuals to challenge and potentially change domestic law."
Not surprisingly, what followed was a dramatic growth in the number of
cases brought before the ECHR. To handle the growing volume and streamline
the judicial process, Protocol 11 of the Convention, which entered into force in
1998, dissolved the Commission and established a new, permanent ECHR with
jurisdiction and the right of individual petition mandatory for all member
states.62 Further, during that time, the Convention was signed and ratified by
Eastern European countries; at present, the Convention applies to practically the
entire continent. 63 The current volume of ECHR activity is truly remarkable: as
of the end of 2012, the Court had delivered over 16,000 judgments, finding at
least one violation of the Convention in 83 percent of the decisions. 64 Article 1
of the First Protocol is the subject matter concerning which the Court has found
the second-most violations.
The property jurisprudence of ECHR initially opted for a relatively narrow
review of the deprivation or regulation of property, focusing on a lawfulness or
"quality of law" principle under which states only had to demonstrate that they
complied with the formal requirements of their respective legal systems and that
such rules were sufficiently "accessible, precise and foreseeable." This early
approach has thus served as something of a procedural check, focusing on
60

For a review of some of these decisions, see id. at 14-18.

61

See id. at 14-23.

62

See id. at 24-25.

63

The sole exceptions are the Vatican and Belarus. See id.at 22.
ECHR, OVERVIlW 1959-2012 3 (2013), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/

64

Overview_19592012_ENG.pdf.
65

66

See id. at 5.
Tom Allen, Compensationfor Property Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 28 MICH.
INT'L L. 287, 292-94 (2007).
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formalities and due process rather than constructing an independent set of
supranational substantive concepts of property rights and remedies.
This approach changed in the 1982 Sporrung and Lonnroth v. Sweden" and
1986 James v. United Kingdom68 cases, in which the ECHR developed standalone
criteria for reviewing domestic legislation or regulation. The Court now
considers, first, whether a "fair balance was struck between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual's fundamental rights,"6 ' and then ties this substantive criterion of
protection to the general framework of proportionality when considering the
alleged violation of the right to property and the appropriate remedy.70
This supranational set of standards, however, is far from creating a
uniform blueprint for the domestic ordering of property law. As is the case
throughout ECHR jurisprudence, review of national law is subject to the
margin-of-appreciation principle. Briefly summarized, this doctrine goes beyond
the general deference courts award to legislative or administrative bodies in
reviewing their actions, tying it rather to the Convention's central subsidiarity
principle that divides powers among supranational and national institutions." In
the 1976 Handyside v. United Kingdom 2 case, the ECHR considered to what extent
protecting morals justifies limiting free expression. It observed that "it is not
possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform
European conception of morals" and that their policy may vary "from time to
time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterized by a
rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject.",7 This principle has
been extended to all the other provisions of the European Convention and, as
Section III will show, is applied in a particularly broad manner in the public law
property context.
Importantly, the margin of appreciation grants states latitude in setting
forth both ends and means for implementing their policies. In the public security
67

Sporrong and Iinnroth v. Sweden, App. Nos. 7151/75 & 7152/75 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1982), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -57580. Note that all citations to
ECHR cases are keyed to the paragraph numbering of the official online versions rather than the
page numbering in physical reporters.

68

James et al. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1986), availabk at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -57507.

69
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Sporrong Judgment, supra note 67,
SeeJames Judgment, supra note 68,
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See JAMES A. SWEENEY, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
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UNIVERSALITY IN TRANSITION 32-36 (2013).

v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1976),
http:/ /hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i00 1-57499.
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context, for example, the doctrine was invoked to allow national authorities a
wide margin in deciding "both on the presence of such an emergency and on the
nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it,"74 with a similar rationale
employed over time in other Convention settings. In the property context, the
argument for the margin of appreciation has relied on the need to defer to the
"more democratically accountable national legislature in pursuing social,
economic, and fiscal policies," assuming that "domestic authorities are better
placed to evaluate the complex and technical nature of such policies and their
specific implementing measures.""
Obviously, the broader the margin of appreciation is, the less intense the
standard of proportionality becomes, thus directly impacting the level of state
commitment to supranational ordering. The European Convention's balancing
act has been a source of much debate, especially to the extent that the margin of
appreciation allows for moral or cultural relativism in the protection of human
rights.76
3. The European Union's quest for internal market harmonization.
The evolution of the EU cannot be comprehensively recounted here. This
subsection points briefly to three themes that will set the ground for a more
detailed discussion of EU-level jurisprudence on the public aspects of property
in Section III and on property's private law aspects in Section IV. I address here,
first, the gradual move of the EU from a limited economic community toward a
more comprehensive institutional and legal framework-though stopping short,
as of yet, of full-scale harmonization. Second, I introduce the concept of
exclusive versus shared competences in the structure of the EU and explore how
this implicates lawmaking in the field of property. Third, I discuss the ways in
which attempts at harmonization are currently broken down in the literature to
"negative" and "positive" components: the former relating mostly to treaty- or
court-based restrictions on domestic lawmaking viewed as hindering the
functioning of the internal market, and the latter referring to EU-level
regulations and directives that explicitly seek to create a uniform body of law
across various property doctrines.
To start with, while the development of the EU has been gradual, laden
with obstacles and setbacks, its supranational aspirations have been substantial
74

Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71,
207 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1978), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -57506.

75

YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THEJURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 164 (2002).
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Recently, Eastern European states have specifically invoked this principle for latitude in making
the gradual transition from totalitarian to democratic societies. See SWEENEY, supra note 71, at 3536.
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from its inception. Even the initial step of establishing the six-member
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 envisaged surpassing the type of
cooperative intergovernmental organization manifested by the Council of
Europe.n The institutional, thematic, and geographical expansion of the
community-turned-union over the decades has been persistent-even if the
underlying debate between those aspiring for full-scale integration and others
content with an expanded version of an intergovernmental European
organization has not yet been clearly settled." The festive declarations by EU
officials, following the 2007 signing of the Lisbon Treaty, that the treaty would
improve "the Union's capacity to pursue one of its central tasks: to shape
globalization,"7 are thus grounded in years of progress toward supranationalism,
although the EU is still marred by elements of incompleteness and is far from a
stable integrative framework."
The EU, presently comprising twenty-eight member states and featuring
seven EU institutions," is the most extensive supranational framework in the
world,82 with the new Treaty on European Union (TEU)," Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)," and Charter of the Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter)s covering more thematic ground
than ever before. At the same time, however, the EU still falls short of being a
77
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See ALLAN ROSAS & LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 9-10 (2d ed.
2012).
See, for example, JEAN-CLAUD PiRIs, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYsis 4648 (2010).
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Diamond Ashiagbor et al., Introduction, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON
1 (Diamond Ashiagbor et al. eds., 2012) (quoting the speech of European Commission President
Jose Manuel Barroso at the 4th Joint Parliamentary Meeting on the Future of Europe, Dec. 4,
2007).

so
81

82

See id. at 5.
The seven EU institutions are the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of
the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU, the European
Central Bank, and the European Court of Auditors.
For a study of these post-Lisbon institutions, see, for example, Laurent Pech, The Institutional
Development of the EU Post-Lisbon:A Case of Plus
Change...?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER
THE TREATY OF LISBON 7, 22-32 (Diamond Ashiagbor et al. eds., 2012).
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
13,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL&
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Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
47 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/ ?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL&from=EN [hereinafter TFEU].
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Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 12, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL&
from=EN [hereinafter EU Charter].
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full-fledged federal entity. As Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati show, the EU has
some state-like features, such as an autonomous legal order; rules addressed
directly to member states and their governmental branches; power to legislate
(exclusive in some areas, shared in others); a system of democratic governance;
judicial controls; a concept of citizenship; economic and monetary union; and a
framework for external relations." But it also has some significant non-state
features, such as reliance for most of its primary law on treaties signed between
the member states; reservation of core elements of national sovereignty in
matters such as security and defense, taxation, immigration, and criminal law;
and the lack of concepts such as territory and population.
Accordingly, a key unsettled theme is whether the EU can be viewed as
governed by some type of constitutional order. As Joseph Weiler aptly notes, the
concept of constitutionalism in the supranational context often remains unclear,
with much of the discourse about "global constitutionalism" and "constitutional
pluralism" featuring both descriptive and normative concerns88 that obviously
cannot be resolved here. On a more pragmatic note, the explicit move toward an
EU constitution undoubtedly failed when the 2004 Constitutional Treaty was
rejected in referenda held in France and the Netherlands; similarly, the progress
toward the 2007 Lisbon Treaty was made possible largely because of the
decisions to amend existing treaties without replacing them and to omit explicit
references to "constitutionalism" and other terms associated with EU
statehood." At the same time, to the extent that constitutionalism refers to a
normative hierarchy in those fields in which EU-level institutions are authorized
to act (meaning that states relinquish a significant level of their domestic
sovereignty in such matters in favor of EU institutions), then constitutionalism
is at least partially adequate in describing the current legal structure of the EU. 0
It is this sense of constitutionalism to which I refer in the EU context.
The focus on this aspect of constitutionalism mandates a brief review of
the competences of EU institutions and the way that these define the scope of
supranational lawmaking in general and the prospects of harmonization in
property law in particular.
Article 2 of the TFEU identifies three distinct categories of EU
competence: exclusive, supporting, and shared." Exclusive competence entrusts
86

See ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 77, at 15-17.
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See id. at 17-19.
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See J.H.H. Weiler, Prologue: Global and Pluralist Consitutionakism - Some Doubts, in TH\WORIDS OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 8,14-15, 17-18 (Griinne de Burca &J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2012).
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Seefor example, PIRIS, supra note 78, at 23-35.
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See ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 77, at 52-65.
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See TFEU, supra note 84, art. 2.
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legislative power only to the EU, unless members are empowered to act by the
EU or work to implement the acts of the Union. Its scope is defined in Article
3(1) of the TFEU, which refers to customs union, competition rules, Euro
monetary policy, marine conservation, common commercial policy, and some
aspects of external relations addressed in Article 3(2)." Supporting competence
enables the EU to act to support, coordinate, and supplement the actions of
member states without superseding their actions in these areas or otherwise
entailing harmonization of national laws. This competence applies to matters
such as protection and improvement of human health, industry, culture, tourism,
and education."
The most intricate type of competence, which is also understood to serve
as a residual category, is that of shared competence. Article 2(2) of the TFEU
provides that member states "shall exercise their competence to the extent that
the Union has not exercised its competence" or "has decided to cease exercising
its competence." 94 The principal (though unclosed) list of areas of shared
competences in Article 4(2) of the TFEU includes eleven items, the most
notable of which for this Article's purposes is "internal market."" The concept
of internal market, which has been a mainstay of the European economic
community from the EU's inception and still serves as its major pillar today, is
articulated in Article 26(2) of the TFEU: "[t]he internal market shall comprise an
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty."9 6
What then are the general implications of the various types of competences
articulated in the TFEU for the creation of supranational property doctrines,
and what is the particular role played by the shared competences of the EU in
the context of the internal market? To ascertain the scope of such competences,
it should be noted, first, that all types of EU powers are subject to principles of
conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality.97 While the conferral principle was
initially understood as an attribution of powers to the EU with a corollary
residual competence of the member states, the current text of Article 4(1) and
5(2) of the TEU stresses that competences not conferred to the Union remain
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See id. art. 3.

93

See id. art. 6.
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Id. art. 2(2).
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See id. art. 4(2).
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Id. art. 26(2).
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See Takis Tridimas, Competence after Lisbon: The Elusive Searchfor Bright Lines, in THE EUROPEAN
UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 47, 49-55 (Diamond Ashiagbor et al. eds., 2012).
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with the member states." Moreover, the subsidiarity and proportionality
doctrines have worked to limit the EU's lawmaking powers." These doctrines
have also implicated the interpretation of Article 114 of the TFEU, which
provides that the treaty's provisions will apply "for the achievement of the
objectives set out in Article 26" in regard to the internal market "save where
otherwise provided in the Treaties," and that the EU institutions shall "adopt
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object
the establishment and functioning of the internal market."o
While Article 114 could have been construed as granting EU institutions an
open-ended mandate to legislate, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in
Germany v. Parliament and Council ' (the Tobacco Advertising case) that the EU
legislature does not have a "general power to regulate the internal market" and
that a "mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk
of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of
competition" forms an insufficient basis to establish EU competence to act.102
The ECJ thus made clear that there is no general competence of the EU to unify
or harmonize law simply by identifying disparity in national laws, and that the
scope of the EU's competences in the context of the internal market must be
functional, exercised only after it has been well established that a certain
disparity between national laws would undermine the functioning of the
market."o3 However, later ECJ cases seem to have opted for a less stringent
approach,10 approving in one case the use of "minimum harmonization" EU
contract legislation adopted under the former version of Article 114 of the
TFEU.os
In the context of property law, another potential challenge to the EU's
competence to create supranational norms is found in Article 345 of the TFEU,
98

99

See TEU, supra note 83, arts. 4(1), 5(2) (noting, in both Articles, that "competences not conferred
upon the [EU] in the Treaties remain with the Member States" and, in Article 5(2), that "[u]nder
the principle of conferral, the [EU] shall act only within the limits of the competences upon it by
the Members States in the Treaties").
See Tridimas, supra note 97, at 49-55.

100 TFEU, supra note 84, art. 114(1).

101 Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419.
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Id. TT 83-84.
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PROPERTY LAW 1029-30 (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012) [hereinafter CASES ON
PROPERTY LAW].
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See Lucinda Miller, European Contract Law After lisbon, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE
TREATY OF LISBON 227, 247-49 (Diamond Ashiagbor et al. eds., 2012).
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See Case C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts & Santurel Inter BVBA, 2008 E.C.R. 1-9947.
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by which "[t]he Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States
governing the system of property ownership.""o' A literal interpretation of this
provision would suggest that property law lies outside the competence of EU
institutions, but the ECJ rejected this approach in Commission v. Belgium 7 (the
Golden Share case). It held that Article 345 "does not have the effect of
exempting the Member States' systems of property ownership from the
fundamental rules of the Treaty."'" In effect, the court held that domestic
legislation conditioning privatization of a company on the allocation of a golden
share to the state and the sale of shares only to persons residing in EU member
states, must be measured by its potential hindrance to the free movement of
capital and cannot avoid such review simply by its doctrinal location in property
law.109

Finally, the move toward supranational norms has been depicted in the
literature as comprising "negative" and "positive" components."' The negative
feature relates mostly to the protection of principles set forth in EU treaties,
such as those relating to the freedom of movement in Article 26 of the TFEU
and now also to the protection of the fundamental individual rights included in
the EU Charter. It appears prominently in ECJ case law and addresses mostly
domestic legislation and regulation, which typically concerns public law
doctrines (discussed in Section III). The "positive" component relates to EU
legislation by regulations, directives, and other legislative acts, subject to the
competence limits discussed above. At least in the property context, positive
supranationalism deals mainly with the ordering of private law relations
(discussed in Section IV). As such, it concerns the more challenging aspect of
creating supranational norms, one that is nevertheless essential in moving
toward fuller-scale property harmonization.

III. PROPERTY LAW: BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Having identified in Section II the basic features of cross-border
mechanisms operating along the coordination-harmonization continuum and
their general role in creating a supranational layer of property norms, I set out in
this section to analyze the disparate implications such supranationalism has for
106

TFEU, supra note 84, art. 345.

107

Case C-503/99, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809.

108

Id.

144.

109 See CASES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 103, at 1033-35.

110 As a point of clarification, note that this literature regularly employs the terms "negative
harmonization" and "positive harmonization." Id. at 1024-25. To avoid confusion with the use of
the term "harmonization" in the context of this Article, I resort here instead to the term
"supranationalism."
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the public and private law aspects of property. While the division between public
and private in property is far from clear-cut, I argue that it makes sense to speak
about the ways in which the structural and normative features of property may
play out differently for core concepts and doctrines in these two realms. These
differences may prove to be particularly dominant in any attempt to switch from
local to supranational property ordering.
This section begins by identifying the general structural features of
property law and their potential implications for supranational ordering.
Examining BITs, the European Convention, and the EU, it then shows that
supranational public law mechanisms have been able to emerge across such
institutions via varying degrees of coordination that create significant common
ground but keep intact substantial local ordering. This state of affairs will be
contrasted in Section IV with the private law setting, in which core doctrines
cannot settle functionally for cross-state coordination if they are to be effective,
whereas normatively, such doctrines may be less likely candidates for
supranationalism because of their unique embeddedness in local history, culture,
and social norms.
A. The Structure of Property Rights
This section addresses three structural traits of property. I have addressed
these features in more detail elsewhere,"' and my goal here is to concisely
portray the core of these attributes so as to set the ground for an analysis of the
challenges in switching from a largely domestic construct of property to a
supranational legal concept, while remaining particularly mindful of the uneasy
distinction between public and private law.
1. Third party applicability.
I use the term "third party applicability" interchangeably with the more
familiar term "in rem." This concept refers to the ways in which legal interests
typically enumerated as property rights-such as ownership, lease, security
interest, or servitude-possess a qualitative trait of general applicability toward a
broad class of persons in establishing the set of legal powers and priorities over
assets. Although property relations may be combined with contract- or tortbased relations, property rights in the broader sense do not merely break down
into bilateral legal relations among specifically defined parties. This is particularly
so because of the way in which legal powers and priorities regarding both
specific assets and categories of resources (land, chattels, intangibles, intellectual

See AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES

13-58 (2013).
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property) regularly implicate numerous parties with diverging features and legal
interests.
Unlike pure contractual relations, parties affected by property's legal
powers and priorities may not be in privity or have prior explicit legal relations
and are often "strangers" that find themselves ex post facto entangled in a clash
over competing claims to an asset. Consider, for example, the legal setting in
which a tract of land is owned by one person, leased by another, mortgaged in
favor of a third party, and subject to an easement in favor of a neighboring
landowner. Property rights reveal their true complexity when actors affected by
the property regime diverge in the particular set of powers and priorities they
hold with respect to the resource.
Moreover, property reveals its complex nature in scenarios involving a
good faith purchaser of voidable or void title, conflicting transactions, and other
types of "legal triangles" where parties who are not in contractual privity find
themselves asserting simultaneous claims to the asset, and property law is
required to prioritize the claims.112 Bankruptcy and similar scenarios also vividly
exemplify the distinctiveness of property rights. In such settings, property rights
(typically, secured interests) have categorical pniority over contractual or
obligatory rights, with a further internal ranking occurring within each of the
different categories of rights.
Beyond the fact that parties to property conflicts may not be known to one
another in advance, they often turn out to be more heterogeneous in their
epistemological, cultural, and social attributes than their typical contractual
counterparts. One can think here of the potential tensions between owners of
patented or copyrighted materials (such as pharmaceutical or software products,
respectively) and different groups of potential users, from competitors to rankand-file end users; or of the ways in which business corporations implicate not
only various groups of shareholders (controlling shareholders, institutional
investors, and minority shareholders from the general public) but also creditors,
suppliers, workers, or the personal creditors of each of the shareholders."'
These disparities create a challenge not only for ordering property relations
within a certain country, but even more so for any attempt to establish
supranational property regimes to accommodate globalization." 4 For property to
112

113

114

See generally Menachem Mautner, 'he Eternal Triangles of the Law": Toward a Theog of Prioritiesin
Conflicts Involving Remote Parties,90 MIcH. L. Riv. 95 (1991).
See generally Amnon Lehavi, The Corporationas a Nexus of Properly (Radzyner Sch. L., Working Paper
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239619.
C Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Propery,
88 NOTRE DAAME L. REv. 1, 9 (2012) (noting that delineations of property tend to be more
resistant to change in property law than in contract law and that in rem aspects of property
remain particularly stable).
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function well in creating, allocating, and enforcing in rem rights across borders,
the legal framework must establish a broad-based understanding among
otherwise diverse audiences across borders about how legal interests in property
are structured and prioritized in cases of conflict. (I will explore this point in
further detail in Section IV in the context of private law doctrines.)
2. Constraints on opting out.
A second qualitative difference between property and other fields that
regulate legal relations among persons concerns the parties' ability to opt out in
favor of private ordering. Contractual parties displeased with the general laws of
contracts can relatively easily opt out of the contract law regime by resorting to
private ordering mechanisms. These private mechanisms may deviate from both
substantive and procedural default rules. Contract law traditionally includes few
restrictions on the power of the parties to do so. Moreover, to coordinate legal
expectations given potential differences among national contract laws,
international transactions typically include specific provisions about the forum
for dispute resolution, choice of law, evidence, and the like, which often deviate
explicitly from the default conflict-of-laws rules in international law."s
Property is different. To the extent that the law sets up certain
requirements for a party to qualify as a good faith purchaser (meaning that she
will have the upper hand in a legal contest with the original owner unduly
stripped of the asset) or to bind third parties (including creditors of the
mortgagor) by registering a security interest, legal actors are much more
constrained in their ability to privately circumvent property law norms. This is in
fact one of the oft-made justifications for the numerus clausus principle, according
to which only limited types of property rights are recognized as such by the legal
system."' This structural principle practically prevents parties from exercising
their nearly unbounded transactional freedom to shape their legal relationships if
they wish their rights to have a binding effect on third parties. Needless to say,
this principle plays out significantly in the legal structuring of property rights
across borders.
The traditional rule in private international law for property conflicts is that
of lex rei sitae: to apply the rules of the legal system of the nation in whose

115

On the prevalence of such provisions and their nexus with the prospect of creating a self-standing
new lex mtercatoia, see generally Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theoies of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 369 (2014).
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See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal StandardiZationin the Law of Properly:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); BRAM AKKERMANS, THE PRINCIPLE OF
NUMERUS CIAUSUS INEUROPEAN PROPERTY LAW (2008).
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territory the object is located."' While at first glance such a rule seems to
provide certainty and predictability, it fails to account for many contingencies
that typify property relations in contemporary supranational settings. Thus, for
example, a security right created in one national jurisdiction (such as a certain
type of lien resulting from the extension of credit) may not be recognized in the
same manner under the laws of a different jurisdiction to which the goods
purchased have been transferred. Such a conflict is particularly acute in scenarios
of conflicting security interests and bankruptcy.
Generally speaking, parties transacting over an asset that may later trigger a
wider-scale property conflict implicating third parties across borders are unable
to bind such third parties by opting for private ordering, though such an
arrangement may be applicable in their bilateral legal relations. The gap between
private ordering and the in rem effect of property can be somewhat mitigated to
the extent that highly sophisticated professional international merchants and
financial institutions devise innovative transnational mechanisms for allocating
financial gains and risks from commercial flows, while still detaching such
financial bulks from specific assets."' But the focus on this distinct subset of
transnational actors should not distract from the current challenges of property
law and the various ways in which globalized markets broadly implicate
indefinite, heterogeneous actors who are unable to allocate risks in advance and
depend on the legal allocation of priorities to assets among distant parties.
Aware of the impediments to cross-border markets that may result from
this state of affairs, some national courts have tried to offer a more nuanced
approach to mitigate the consequences of legal fragmentation."' Thus, for
example, the Dutch Supreme Court held, in the context of the then-in-force
1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,'20
that when parties agree on the law to govern the assignment of claims, it also
applies to the proprietary aspects of the assignment.12 ' In that case, the
assignment of future claims was crafted as part of a retention-of-title clause,

11

see

JAN siiTs, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: TOWARD A IUS COMMUNE
EUROPAFUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM 245 (Nicole Kornet trans., 2002).

118 See 2 DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL. AND TRADE

LAW 547-49 (5th ed. 2013) (arguing that current harmonization efforts in the EU, such as that of
the Draft Common Frame of Reference, fail to distinguish between the needs of professionals
and consumers and that the focus of current transnational property law should lie in promoting
flexibility and party autonomy for professionals).
19
See CASES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 103, at 1020-22.
120 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, 1605 U.N.T.S. 80.

121 See HR 16 mei 1997, NJ 1998, 585 (Brandsmna qq/Hansa Chemie AG) (Netb.). For a detailed review,
see generally Teun H.D. Struycken, The ProprietaryAspects of InternationalAssgnmentof Debts and the
Rome Convention, Article 12, 1998 LLOYD's MAR. & COM. L.Q. 345.
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protecting a German seller of chemical products against a Dutch buyer while
assigning to the seller the right to future claims of the buyer vis-a-vis subsequent
purchasers. The Dutch buyer went bankrupt prior to paying the German seller,
but only after receiving payment from a subsequent buyer of the products,
creating a conflict between the German seller and the Dutch trustee in the
insolvency proceedings. While German law-which governed the original
contract of sale including the assignment provision-allows for transfer of
claims for security purposes, Dutch law generally restricts it. The court's
decision to apply German law to the proprietary aspects of the assignment, in
view of the fact that the parties to the original contract agreed to apply it,
determined priority in favor of the German seller, although such an interest was
not otherwise recognized in Dutch law.'22
As Sjef van Erp and Bram Akkermans note, the willingness of the Dutch
court to give a proprietary status to the original parties' private ordering on the
choice of law stemmed, first, from a desire to avoid the adverse consequences
for trade that would have resulted from invalidating this type of German-law
security interest under Dutch substantive law, and, second, from the court's
inability to otherwise find an equivalent property right under Dutch law.'23
It should be clear, however, that the advantage of allowing parties to the
original transaction to allocate the property risks involved with a cross-border
transition of assets may be more than offset by the uncertainty and
unpredictability incurred by third parties.124 The problem of recognizing private
ordering schemes in cross-border settings goes well beyond the general problem
of publicity (or notice) that is often discussed under conventional national
laws.'25 It inflicts on third parties across borders the burden of being subjected
to types of property interests that are unknown or even explicitly forbidden
under the domestic law they deem to be applicable in the regular course of
events.
This tension thus touches directly on one of the key points this Article
makes: private law doctrines that implicate the property rights of various (often
indefinite) parties across borders require a comprehensive top-down mechanism
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See HR 16 mei 1997, NJ 1998, 585 (Brandsmaqq/HansaChemieAG) (Neth.).
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See CASES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 103, at 1020-21.
See, for example, Eric Dirix, Effects of Security Rights vis-a-vis Third Persons, in DIVERGENCES OF
PROPERTY LAW, AN OBSTACLE TO THE INTERNAL MARKET? 69 (Ulrich Drobnig et al. eds., 2006).
Compare Merrill & Smith, supra note 116 (arguing that information costs and the need for publicity
of property rights justify the numerus clauses principle), with Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Properly, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibiliy of
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002) (offering a more nuanced approach by which law's
limitations on property rights serve not to standardize but to facilitate verification of ownership of
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of supranational ordering that facilitates a more predictable and definite
allocation of risks involved in moving assets, tangible or intangible, across
borders. Such mechanisms often cannot settle for mere coordination and leave
intact a substantial amount of local lawmaking. In order to facilitate the
identification and validation of a single ranking of priorities to an asset,
supranational property norms must seek a more comprehensive harmonization
scheme.
3. The public/private interface.
A third distinctive structural facet of property-one which occupies a key
role in this Article-concerns the complex public/private interface. The general
challenge faced by legal systems in designing property law is how to delineate the
borders of permissible government interference with property, while
simultaneously defining the scope and nature of property rights vis-t-vis the
entire spectrum of private third parties.
Although the task of drawing the lines between public/constitutional legal
norms and those controlling private conduct is familiar in many other fields of
law, property does seem to introduce a special challenge. That the very same
term, "property," is used in both the private law field that orders legal relations
among persons with regard to assets and the public/constitutional realm, is not
merely a matter of historical accident or conceptual confusion. While the
standard, mostly liberal arguments in favor of some differentiation between
government conduct and private conduct may apply to property, any attempt to
hermetically separate the two realms of property law would be both impractical
and normatively awkward. The result is one of constant tension between public
and private. Whereas different legal systems may reach different results in
attempting to draw the lines between public and private, the normative debate is
not free of constraints and is implicated by how the structure of property rights
encompasses both realms. 126
I suggest, however, that in the supranational context one can make an
intelligible-even if not hermetic-distinction between public and private
property law, at least for the purposes of identifying and delineating the
challenges of shifting to a cross-border property regime.
In the context of public law doctrines, such as those dealing with direct
expropriation or regulation that may amount to indirect expropriation (or, in
contrast, those addressing governmental benefits such as up-zoning of land,
licenses, or transfer payments), sovereign power is regularly not dispersed, even
in the global era, among numerous countries. This is so although exceptions may
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See LiHAVI,
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exist, such as taxation or securities regulation of multinational corporations.
While parties implicated by such governmental acts may be residents of different
countries-that is, local residents alongside foreign investors-the locus of the
act of expropriation or regulation can still be typically attributed to a particular
government, one that is not inevitably related to the actions of other domestic
governments. Accordingly, I argue below that, at least as a structural and
functional matter, public law doctrines can often settle for cross-border
coordination rather than aspiring for full-scale harmonization. This means
supranational mechanisms can quite feasibly create a certain common
denominator that would hold countries accountable for substandard
expropriatory or regulatory actions while preserving significant leeway in
establishing domestic policy ends and means.
In contrast, private law doctrines that may implicate numerous, indefinite
parties are placed under particular structural, functional, and normative pressure
in supranational contexts. As Section IV will show, the multiplicity of domestic
legal sources that may implicate the ordering of powers and priorities of assets
poses a particular challenge for the functioning of property rights, thus creating
a more pressing demand for harmonization. Unlike domestic governments,
private parties do not have the capacity to fully control the applicable legal
regime and are thus particularly sensitive to scenarios of legal fragmentation that
may undermine the in rem essentiality of property interests.
B. Why Cross-Border Public Law Doctrines Can Settle
for Coordination
By settling for coordination rather than aspiring for harmonization, the
supranational institutions analyzed in this Article have been able to create
frameworks involving cross-state commitments for protecting property from
states' vertical exercise of their legislative and regulatory powers.
This is not to say, however, that such coordination, relying at least on
identifying a common denominator in conceptualizing property and ensuring
due process for its protection, is a trivial matter for sovereign countries. Thus, in
its nonbinding 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN General
Assembly included the right to property,'28 but later attempts to incorporate
such a right into binding UN instruments have failed, though not due to neglect.
127

See, for example, STEPHEN D. COHLEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: AVOIDING SIMPICITY, EMBRACING COMPiLExITY 252-81 (2007).
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A/RES/217(I1) (Dec. 10, 1948) (holding that (1) "[e]veryone has the right to own property alone
as well as in association with others," and (2) "[njo one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property").

484

Vol. 15 No. 2

Strategies to Globali.e Propert

LLebavi

Intense negotiations failed on this point during the 1950s and 1960s largely
because of the reluctance of the USSR and newly independent African countries
to subject their domestic lawmaking to international scrutiny.129 A more recent
effort conducted shortly after the fall of the Soviet bloc also came up short, with
the reporter for the UN Commission on Human Rights noting that "it is
extremely difficult to establish a universal human right to individual private
property in terms that one can substantiate as requiring incorporation in the
national law of all States and capable of being given the same weight to [sic] in
domestic courts."1 30
This means that current cross-border mechanisms that subject local
lawmaking to supranational procedural or substantive norms entail a significant
commitment on the part of countries. At the same time, however, such
undertakings prove more practicable when they focus on the public aspect of
property law and locate the threshold of coordination at a point that allows
states sufficient leeway in promoting domestic ends and means.
1. BITs and investment treaty jurisprudence.
Recall the prevailing conceptualization of BIT jurisprudence as moving
beyond commercial arbitration to establish a system of supranational
public/constitutional norms that balances the protection of investors' property
rights against domestic legislative and regulatory powers. Accepting this view of
cross-border investment law, however, does not necessarily countenance
harmonization of national property systems. BIT jurisprudence should be more
accurately defined as a coordination mechanism that seeks to establish certain
thresholds of treatment standards while maintaining a significant layer of local
diversity. This subsection seeks to demonstrate some of the ways in which this
emerging body of law attains such coordination by focusing on two of its
standards that have proven dominant: expropriation (direct or indirect) and fair
and equitable treatment.
Let us first examine the concept of expropriation. As the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) notes, "[t]he first stage of
international investment rule-making was shaped by sharp disagreement within
the international community concerning the extent to which customary
international law protects foreign investment against adverse treatment by the

129

130

See John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. Riv. 461, 466-68
(2012).
Indep. Expert to U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., The Right of Evegone to Own ProperyAlone as Wellas
in Association with Others, 1 475, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993) (by Luis Valencia
Rodriguez).
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host state.".. A wave of massive direct expropriations of foreign investors'
assets sparked the emergence of BITs, and expropriations continue to preoccupy
states, investors, and arbitration tribunals when managing and interpreting
existing treaties. 3 2 Accordingly, every BIT includes provisions that refer to and
seek to govern the use and consequences of expropriations or other similar
measures. 33
Direct expropriations of investments are still prevalent and have been the
subject of numerous arbitral awards. The tests for establishing direct
expropriation have been relatively solidified in BIT jurisprudence. In the 2012
Burlington v. Ecuador case,' 4 the tribunal interpreted direct expropriation as
amounting to an act of dispossession that permanently deprives the investor of
its investment and that cannot otherwise be justified under the police power
doctrine.' 5 The requirement of dispossession or a formal taking of title in the
asset as a condition for establishing direct expropriation, allows for relative
clarity in identifying the scope of such expropriations.' 36
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the law of direct
expropriations is already harmonized or will necessarily become so. One source
of disparity may arise from the current incongruence between different practices
of direct expropriations and the remedies awarded. Jan Dalhuisen and Andrew
Guzman seek to identify different categories of "takings" by mapping them onto
expropriatory and non-expropriatory takings, and for each such category,

131

132
133

134

135

136

UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way Forward
10 (2008), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
For example, Article 13 of the 2004 Canadian model BIT provides: "Neither Party shall
nationalize or expropriate a covered investment either directly, or indirectly through measures
having an effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation ... except for a public purpose, in
accordance with due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and on prompt, adequate
and effective compensation.... Such compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place." Canada Model
Foreign Investment Protection Agreement art. 13, available at http://italaw.com/documents/
Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter Canadian Model BIT].
Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Liability (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Burlington].
See id. 506. According to the police power doctrine, "a State may justify deprivations of private
property on the basis of its police powers in order to promote the general welfare and enforce its
laws on its territory." Id. 1 471. The tribunal found no such justification in this case. See id. 529.
See, for example, A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW 336-39 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting that the acquisition of property is said to distinguish direct expropriations from
"deprivations," but also suggesting that this feature should serve as only one element in
conceptualizing expropriations in a broader sense).
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whether such a taking is lawful or unlawful.' But as they observe, the current
state of affairs in international investment law is such that all types of
compensable takings are typically subject to the same kind of remedy: fair
market value compensation. This is so because arbitral tribunals are reluctant to
grant other remedies, such as specific performance, reinstatement, or restitution,
which are at times awarded by national courts.138 What this means, at least as of
now, is that some states may practically engage in discriminatory direct
expropriations-ones in which there is no demonstrable public purpose or those
lacking due process-without having to incur a compensation premium. While
countries may face some reputational costs, they are not subjected to supersanctions for sticking to such direct expropriation practices. In this sense, BIT
jurisprudence does not itself work to harmonize national laws and practices even
with respect to direct expropriations.
A more complicated task is that of devising a legal concept of indirect
expropriation, particularly one that would allow for a significant level of
coordination among states and vis-A-vis investors, even if it would not result in
harmonization of national regimes on the matter.
The problem of indirect expropriations (or "regulatory takings," as they are
known in the U.S.) is one of the most intricate topics in property law in just
about every legal system.'39 Indirect expropriations pose additional problems in
the context of international investment jurisprudence because of the tension
between constructing a set of supranational norms on protecting foreign
investment and preserving the ability of states to set forth public policy, promote
societal values, and respond to changes.
Although a full-scale analysis of the evolution of this doctrine in BIT
jurisprudence is outside the scope of this Article,'"' it is interesting to note that

137

See Jan H. Dalhuisen & Andrew T. Guzman, Expropnatory and Non-ExpropriatoU Takings Under
InternationalInvestment law (UC Berkeley Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 2137107, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137107. Dalhuisen and Guzman
suggest that a taking would be generally considered non-expropriatory if it promotes a "'super'
public purpose" or is "incidental to a legitimate, ordinary government action." Id. at 5. Yet even a
non-expropriatory taking could be unlawful and justify compensation if, for example, it violates a
particular undertaking or other assurance provided by the host government. See id. at 13.

138

See id.at

139

See generally William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the lily: How Confusion over Regulatory
Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GI.o. WASH. L. Riv. 429
(2005); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
RILv. 561 (1984).

14-17.

140 See MONrr, supra note 54, at 231-36 (defining the "complicated enterprise" of finding this
equilibrium).
141 For a detailed analysis, see id. at 231-91.

Winter 2015

487

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

the Canadian model BITI42 (and less surprisingly, the U.S. onel43) embraces the
U.S. Supreme Court's three-prong test for identifying regulatory takings
developed in Penn Central Tranportation Co. v. City of New York.'" Arbitration
tribunals have sought, however, to develop independent standards or to refer to
other prominent supranational instruments, such as the European
Convention.14 5
Recent cases concerning indirect expropriations emphasize a number of
elements. First, tribunals study the magnitude of the adverse effects of the
indirect expropriation on the "the investment as a whole"' 46 and whether the
expropriation substantially "deprive[s] the investor of the economic value, use or
enjoyment of its investment."' 4 7 Second, some tribunals have also looked at the
reasonableness and proportionality of the expropriatory measure.'48 Third,
recent cases have debated whether proving indirect expropriation requires a
showing of a "loss of control" over the investment, beyond "mere loss of
value," coming at times to different conclusions.14 9 Fourth, several tribunals have
taken into consideration the "investor's reasonable expectations." This
parameter has received various interpretations, with some tribunals examining
more generally whether a domestic policy in effect at the time an investment was
made creates some sort of a vested interest,so and others focusing on specific

142

Canadian Model BIT, supra note 133, Annex B.13(1).

143

2012
U.S.
Model
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty,
Annex
B,
available
http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].

144

438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central test, essentially copied by these model BITs, looks at: (1)
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations;" and (3) "the character of the governmental
action." Id. at 124.
See, for example, Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, T 122 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133, 164 (2004) (discussing the
"proportionality" test and referring to the use of this doctrine in a number of cases decided by the
ECHR).
Burlington, ICSID Case. No. ARB/08/5, 404.

145

146
147
148

149

1so

at

Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 328 (Dec. 7, 2011).
See, for example, Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on
Liability, $T 196-97 (Dec. 21, 2010).
Compare El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award,
% 245, 249 (Oct. 31, 2011) (holding that "the decisive element in an indirect expropriation is the
'loss of control of a foreign investment" and that "a mere loss in value of the investment, even if
important, is not an indirect expropriation") (emphasis in original), with Burlington, ICSID Case.
No. ARB/08/5, T 397 (holding that "[t]he loss of viability does not necessarily imply a loss of
management or control" and "[w]hat matters is the capacity to earn a commercial return").
See, for example, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. v. United States, Award (ICSID Jan. 12,
2011), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf.
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circumstances, such as whether the host state made any representations to the
investor. 151
What lessons can be drawn from the multitude of tests in BIT
jurisprudence about the scope of coordination among nations with regard to the
laws of indirect expropriations? Can we identify a single set of legal norms
applying to all states so that the same type of factual conduct will receive the
same legal treatment by arbitral tribunals regardless of the background legal rules
in domestic systems? Is BIT jurisprudence pushing states to harmonize or
standardize their laws on this point?
I suggest that this is not the case and that BIT jurisprudence can be said to
create a significant threshold of coordination but not uniformity. Although BIT
jurisprudence seems to have established a certain set of criteria for identifying
indirect expropriations, these criteria are designed as "legal standards" rather
than as hard-edged rules.152 This means that their application by various
arbitration tribunals may diverge across cases, especially because of the lack of a
strict principle of stare decisi, 53 moreover, standards entail at least some degree of
deference to states in lawmaking or regulation. Although the issue of deference
on a national level revolves around the allocation of powers between a legislative
or administrative body and the court, on the supranational level it entails the
additional component of allowing for a certain scope of diversity among national
legal systems. Such diversity may even go beyond the latitude that the European
Convention grants under the "margin of appreciation" doctrine (discussed in the
next subsection).
The issue of deference in international investment law and its implications
for the establishment of coordination is further demonstrated in the case of the
fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard that typifies BITs. 154 Contemporary
BIT jurisprudence points to the complexity and often ambiguity of this concept.
1s1
152

153
154

See, for exampe, Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case. No. ARB/98/5, Award (July 26,
2001).
See generally Amnon Lehavi, Tbe Dynamic Law of Properly: Theoring the Rok of Legal Standards, 42
RUTGERS L.J. 81 (2010).
See MONTT, supra note 54, at 288-91.
According to several commentators, this standard traces its roots to Article 11(2) of the 1948
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, which contemplated that foreign
investments should be assured "just and equitable treatment." Seefor example, Christoph Schreuer,
Fairand Equitable Treatment inArbitralPractice,6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT& TRADE 357, 357 (2005).
Theodore Kill, however, has argued that this concept dates further back to the 1919 Covenant of
the League of Nations. See Theodore Kill, Note, Don't Cross the Streams: Past and Present
Overstatement of Customary TnternationalLaw in Connection with Conventional Fairand Equitable Treatment
Obligations, 106 MIcH. L. Ri;v. 853, 870 (2008) (noting that Article 23(e) of the Covenant calls on
its members "to secure and maintain ... equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of
the League").
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In the oft-cited Metalclad v. Mexico arbitration,' the ICSID tribunal found a
violation of the FET standard in Mexico's failure to ensure a "transparent and
predictable framework for Metalclad's business planning and investment" in
view, inter alia, of the "absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a
municipal construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice
or procedure as to the manner of handling [municipal construction permit]
applications.""' The focus, therefore, is on transparency and due process, not on
a substantive template for regulation under the FET provision.
Subsequent cases have identified several parameters circumscribing the
FET standard. In the 2012 Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka'57 case, the tribunal
referred to (1) "protection of legitimate and reasonable expectations which have
been relied upon by the investor to make the investment"; (2) "good faith
conduct[,] although bad faith on the part of the State is not required for its
violation"; (3) "conduct that is transparent, consistent and not discriminatory";
and (4) "conduct that does not offend judicial propriety, that complies with due
process and the right to be heard.""' In Swisslion v. Macedonia,'"' the tribunal
noted that the FET standard "basically ensures that the foreign investor is not
unjustly treated, with due regard to all surrounding circumstances,""o while the

Electrabel v. Hungay"' tribunal emphasized that the "requirement of fairness
must not be understood as the immutability of the legal framework, but as
implying that subsequent changes should be made fairly, consistently and
predictably."l 62 Some tribunals also have incorporated the obligation of
proportionality into the FET standard."'
What emerges from this body of cases on the FET standard? According to
UNCTAD, recent decisions "highlight the potential unpredictability of the
standard as tribunals continue[] to emphasize its flexible nature and coverage of

15

Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case. No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
2000).

156

Id.

1s7

Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2,
Award (Oct. 31, 2012).

158 Id.

Award (Aug. 30,

88, 99.

1420.

DOO Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/16, Award (July 6, 2012).

159 Swisslion
16o

Id.

273.

161 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012).
162 Id. 17.77.

163

See, for example, Occidental Petroleum
No. ARB/06/11, Award (Oct. 5, 2012).
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a number of elements."' 6 4 Even if we avoid the skeptical view that FET is
inherently embedded in excessive ad hoc jurisprudence, what seems to emerge is
an attempt to coordinate a certain threshold of treatment, one that focuses not
so much on substantive outcomes but the procedures of decision-making. While
the coordination of procedures in regard to the public law aspects of property is
far from trivial, it nevertheless leaves significant room for differentiation. As
noted, in the supranational setting, deference to national-level lawmakers
translates into tolerance of at least some degree of localism in lawmaking and an
unwillingness to attempt harmonization of the regulation of investments and
protection of property.
Such an approach is welcomed by authors who argue that, while the "BIT
generation must define minimum thresholds that determine what is expected
from a reasonably well-behaved regulatory state," state liability in the FET
context should be imposed only when the state "fail[s] to maintain the usual
order which . . . is the duty of every state to maintain within its territory."'

If

this is the case, then the creation of supranational public law norms for the
protection of property rights indeed constitutes a coordination mechanism that
fosters investments without entirely undermining domestic policymaking.
2. Property constitutionalism and the margin of appreciation.
As explained in Section II, the European Convention and the EU Charter
are now commonly understood as comprising a supranational bill of rights for
the member states of the Council of Europe and the European Union,
respectively. However, the extent to which constitutional or constitutional-like
property provisions, namely Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European
Convention and Article 17 of the EU Charter, preempt the local ordering of
property depends on the tradeoff between the scope of supranational principles
such as proportionality or fair balance and the breadth of the margin of
appreciation given to states' design and implementation of local policies.
Consider, first, the European Convention. The general approach of the
ECHR is to review economic matters such as property under a relatively lax
standard, granting states a wide margin of appreciation. Moreover, since the
Convention, unlike the EU instruments, does not regulate markets but solely
protects human rights, property has not been ranked as a particularly vulnerable

1

165

UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Apr. 2012, at 7, availabk at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicatonsLibrary/webdiaeia20l2d10_en.pdf.
MONTT, supra note 54, at 367.
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human right and has not otherwise been tied to overarching treaty goals (such as
ensuring market access)."'
There is, however, a difference between the scope of the margin granted in
cases said to implicate the "deprivation" of property under the first paragraph of
Article 1 of the First Protocol and in those dealing with regulation that works to
"control the use of property" under Article 1's second paragraph." The first
type of case is usually subject to a higher level of scrutiny and stricter application
of supranational standards such as fair balance and proportionality (in defining
cases of deprivation and assessing due compensation)."' This may be due to the
fact that, compared to a regulation "controlling" the use of property, a
deprivation-that is, permanent dispossession or compulsory transfer of titleis easier to identify, typically considered a more serious injury to property, and
may be easier to quantify for purposes of the fair market value standard.'
On the other hand, when evaluating a regulation that controls the use of
property without expropriating it de facto or de jure, the ECHR has granted
states a particularly wide margin of appreciation to design an underlying policy,
choose the most appropriate means to achieve such legitimate social ends, and
evaluate the effects that such means have on property interests.170 Moreover,
when applying the various prongs of the proportionality test, the ECHR has not
required states to choose the least restrictive means as long as the chosen local
measure remains "within the bounds of its margin of appreciation.""' This
lenient approach has been criticized as reducing the proportionality assessment

166

See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 164-67 (2012).

167

The first paragraph reads: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law."
The second paragraph states: "The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties." European Convention, supra note 9, Protocol 1, art. 1.

168

See ARAi-TAKAHASHI, supra note 75, at 149-50.

169

See Allen, supra note 66, at 298-300, 313-15 (noting, however, that fair market value generally
ignores the overall impact on the victim's economic security).
See, for exavple, AGOSI v. U.K., App. No. 9118/80, 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1986), available at
74 8
1 ("[Ihe State enjoys a wide
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-5
margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to
ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the
purpose of achieving the object of the law in question.").
Mellacher et al. v. Austria, App. Nos. 10522/83, 11011/84 & 11070/84, 153 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -57616.
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to a minimum level. 72 The normative debate notwithstanding, as a positive
matter this approach can be said to place the cross-state commitment embedded
in the property clause of the European Convention closer to the "coordination"
model, which grants states significant leeway in embracing domestic policy and
exposes them, at worst, to the payment of fair market value when the domestic
regulation is considered excessive.
It also should be noted that the ECHR does not grant special consideration
to cross-border investments or property interests, but treats them in the same
manner that it deals with a petition submitted by a plaintiff against its home
state."' This is because the European Convention is neither specifically oriented
toward protecting foreign investment nor entrusted, as the EU is, with the task
of facilitating an internal market among its member states. This means that the
same standard of review would apply to domestic and foreign plaintiffs, and the
effect of ECHR jurisprudence on cross-border coordination of property
protection would derive from the general balance that the court strikes between
supranational and national norms.17 4 At times, the court has even hinted that
holders of property interests should be aware of the regulatory risks involved
with moving across national borders."'
Moving to the EU context, it should be noted at the outset that the ECJ's
review of national lawmaking that arguably contradicts EU law, referred to in
Section II as aimed at negative supranationalism,"' is premised on various
provisions in the EU's treaties, directives, and regulations: some concern the
freedom of movement across the EU's internal market, while others deal more
specifically with the right to property.

172

See, for exampk, ARAi-TAKAHASHI, supra note 75, at 156-57.

17

One exception concerns the provision regarding the "general principles of international law" in
the first paragraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol, which the ECHR has interpreted not to
apply to a "taking by a State of the property of its own nationals." James judgment, sipranote 68,
58-66.
See Christian Tomeuschat, The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection, in

174

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 636, 642-46 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
175

176

See, for example, Gasus Dosier-und Fordertechnik GmbH v. Netherlands, App. No. 15375/89,
$$ 66-70 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-57918 (holding that the ranking of security interests under Dutch law,
according to which the rights of a German creditor holding a retention-of-title interest in a
concrete mixer located in the Netherlands was inferior to a statutory lien of the Dutch national
tax collector over the mixer, does not amount to disproportional interference, because "Gasus
[the creditor] could therefore not have expected otherwise than that the effectiveness of their
retention of title in the face of the seizure depends on Netherlands law" and that it "could have
eliminated their risk altogether by declining to extend credit to Adas [the debtor]").
See supra text accompanying notes 109-110.
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One prominent mode of review focuses on the protection of free
movement in the internal market, with property-related disputes addressing
mostly the movement of capital and goods and inquiring whether a certain
domestic legislation or regulation, by limiting free movement, unduly hinders the
functioning of the internal market. The second and more recent front follows
from the formal adoption of the EU Charter, which includes the protection of
the right to property in Article 17 and serves as a potential limit on domestic
lawmaking-one that goes beyond freedom of movement issues.
Consider first the free movement of capital, guaranteed, inter alia, in
Article 26 of the TFEU."' The ECJ has invoked these guarantees to constrain
national property legislation limiting the acquisition of land. In Konle v. Austria,"'
the ECJ invalidated an Austrian legislative provision by which foreigners wishing
to purchase land in the Tyrol region had first to obtain administrative
authorization. Konle, a German citizen, was denied such authorization by the
Austrian court under a policy limiting the purchase of second homes in order to
preserve the Alpine environment. 79 The ECJ ruled that restrictions on crossborder land acquisition generally amount to restraints on the free movement of
capital."so
In a subsequent case, Reisch v. Mayor of Sal.burg,"' the ECJ reviewed a local
law that, for certain types of transactions, required potential acquirers of land in
Salzburg to declare, first, that they are nationals of Austria or another EU
member state, and second, that the land will be used as a principal residence or
will meet a commercial need. Based on such a declaration, the local Austrian
land commission would then issue a confirmation of the transaction but could
refuse to do so if it had reason to suspect either that the land would not be used
for the declared goal or that the transaction was otherwise inconsistent with the
local law.'82 The ECJ held that the applicant's status as an Austrian national did
not make interpretation of EU law unnecessary, given the potential application
of the local law to residents of other member states. The ECJ went further and
invalidated the local ordinance, holding that the specific statutory scheme was

177

In addition, the free movement of capital is guaranteed in Article 63 of the TFEU and Directive
88/361/EEC. See TFEU, supra note 84, art. 63(1); Council Directive 88/361, 1988 OJ. (1 178) 5

178

Case C-302/97, Konle v. Austria, 1999 E.C.R.

179

See id.

1-7.

180

See id.

21-22.

181

Joined Cases C-515, C-519-C-524 & C-526-C-540/99,
Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, 2002 E.C.R. I-2157.

182

See id.

(EEC).

1-3099.
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v. Bbirgermeister
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cumbersome and not "strictly indispensable" to achieve the admittedly legitimate
goal of preventing tourist colonies.18 3
A somewhat different line of reasoning has typified the ECJ's approach to
cases involving the guarantees of the freedom of movement of goods found in
Articles 26 and 34 of the TFEU, which prohibit "[q]uantitative restrictions on
imports and all measures having equivalent effect."' 8 4 Although initial cases dealt
with more explicit forms of local restrictions on trade-the seminal 1979 Cassis
de Deyon decision' sets the tone for such case law-current ECJ cases and
scholarly contributions have discussed the potential expansion of Article 34 and
the pressure that this could put on national legal systems and property law rules
in particular.
According to several commentators, differences among national property
systems can lead, under certain circumstances, to hindering the free movement
of goods between countries and should be considered as "having equivalent
effect" to the quantitative restrictions prohibited by the TFEU.' This is
especially so, under this view, when a certain type of property right recognized in
one member state is not recognized in the legal system of another, affecting
cross-border traders and hindering intra-EU trade contrary to Article 34.18
The most notable ECJ case dealing with the potential implications of
divergent national property laws regulating the free movement of goods is the
pre-EU 1990 Krantq case.'88 Krantz, a German company, sold and delivered
machines to a Dutch company subject to a reservation-of-title clause. Because
the machines were installed in the Dutch company's facilities without full
payment of consideration, the Dutch tax collector seized the machines on the
basis of a Dutch law authorizing it to seize debtor property-even if owned by a
third party-to secure the payment of taxes. Rejecting Krantz's petition, the ECJ
reasoned that this seizure right under Dutch law, which effectively trumped the
reservation-of-title clause, could not be viewed as hindering trade between
member states.'

183

Seeid. 38.

184

This language is taken from Article 34 of the TFEU, supra note 84.
185 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
186 See,for example, Eva-Maria Kieninger, Securities in Movabk Propery Within the Common Market, 4 EuR.
REv. PRIVATE L. 41 (1996).
187 See Bram Akkermans, Properv LynI and the Internal Market, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN
PROPERTY LAW 199, 204-10 (Sjef van Erp et al. eds., 2012).
88
189

Case C-69/88, H. Krantz GmbH v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen, 1990 E.C.R. 1-583.
See id. T$ 11-12.
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The Krant. decision has been criticized.'" But by rejecting the notion that a
mere difference between national property systems would categorically amount
to violation of EU law, and in light of the prevailing conception that Article 34
lacks "horizontal direct effect,""' the ECJ placed the protection of the freedom
of movement in the TFEU well within a constitutional-like framework that
explicitly stops short of seeking full-scale harmonization of property law.
Domestic property lawmaking contested as violating the EU treaties' protection
of free movement of goods is thus evaluated under the general tests that the
ECJ has developed for the compatibility of national lawmaking with EU norms.
This means that, in reviewing a potential violation of the internal market's four
freedoms, the ECJ, on one hand, requires member states to demonstrate a
legitimate national goal and proportionality of the local measures to the aim
pursued, but, on the other, it grants states a considerable margin of appreciation
in defining both ends and means and adheres to the broader notion of
subsidiarity.
Accordingly, to the extent that a property system in one country refuses to
recognize types of property interests prevalent in other national systems or
otherwise prioritizes property interests so as to undermine the ranking of
property rights that typify the law of another member state-as was the case in
Krantq-the deviating state would have to point to a legitimate goal (such as
protecting third parties, including other creditors, that rely on the domestic
system of property rights) and proportionate measures. Yet it would not be
otherwise hard-pressed to move toward harmonization of its property law with
that of other states.192
The other major setting in which the concept of supranational
constitutionalism plays out in the ECJ's review of domestic lawmaking on
property rights is in the context of the EU Charter, which formally went into
force in 2009 alongside the Lisbon Treaty and protects the right to property in
Article 17.19'
The EU Charter is presently considered to apply only vertically-that is, to
EU institutions or national lawmakers, but not to private actors. At the same
190 See, for example, Akkermans, supra note 187, at 218-22.
191 See id. at 219-20.
192

See id. at 210-17.
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See generaly EU Charter, supra note 85. The concept of fundamental rights was not entirely outside
the scope of the EU before adoption of the Charter. Various treaties contained scattered
provisions dealing with issues such as non-discrimination on the ground of nationality or gender
equality, and pre-Charter cases indicated that fundamental rights formed an integral part of
community law. But this was a long way from any type of bill of rights. See P.P. Craig, The Charter,
the EC and NationalCourts, in TI- EUROPEAN UNION ArER THE TREATY OF LIsBoN 78, 79-81
(Diamond Ashiagbor et al. eds., 2012).
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time, the application of the EU Charter to member states is construed in a
relatively broad manner. This means that the Charter would apply not only when
states specifically act as agents of the Union in applying EU law, but also when
the substance of the domestic law falls within the general scope of EU norms
embodied in treaties, directives, and regulations.'9 4
A key feature of the definition of rights included in the Charter is
expounded in Article 52(3):
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.' 95
Moreover, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Charter has
identified the rights, including the right to enjoyment of property, that
"correspond" to those included in the European Convention.'
The result of the foregoing, quite simply, is that the ECHR's current
jurisprudence serves as the baseline for assessing both the right to property in
the Charter and the potential supranational effect of judicial review carried out
by the ECJ or national courts. However, the ECJ's case law may diverge from
that of the ECHR over time because of the aforementioned provision in Article
52(3) of the Charter, which allows EU law to expand the scope of protection
beyond that provided by the European Convention. More generally, the two
bodies of case law may diverge simply because these two distinct institutions of
judicial review operate simultaneously and without clear institutional hierarchy.""
The ECJ's post-Charter property jurisprudence has focused not so much
on instances of state lawmaking as to subject matter within the general scope of
EU law, but rather on EU-level legislation contested as unduly violating the right
to property. Most notable is a series of cases dealing with decisions by EU
institutions to freeze the funds of persons affiliated with certain foreign regimes
and organizations. In its 2013 Trabelsi v. Council decision,' the ECJ invalidated
the Council of the EU's decision to freeze the assets of one of the petitioners,
finding it violative of his right to property. Holding that a limitation on the
exercise of the right of property must (1) "have a legal basis," (2) "refer to an
objective of public interest, recognized as such by the EU," and (3) "not be
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See Craig, sfpra note 193, at 87-91.
EU Charter, supra note 85, art. 52(3).
See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 17.
See Craig, supranote 193, at 101-04.
Case T-187/11, Trabelsi v. Council (2013), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsPdocid= 137742&doclang=EN.
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excessive"-meaning that it "must be necessary and proportional to the aim
sought" without impairing the "essential content" of the right-the Court held
that the Council failed to meet this test in the specific circumstances of the first
applicant.'
It remains to be seen, therefore, how the ECJ will develop its case law on
the right to property in the context of state lawmaking and the potential negative
supranationalizing effect embedded in the Charter's Article 17. As noted, while
Article 52(3) of the Charter seeks generally to tie together ECJ and ECHR
jurisprudence, divergence may still reign as states grapple with the tradeoff
between hewing to supranational property-right standards at the expense of state
sovereignty and invoking the margin of appreciation to legitimize local
constitutionalism. On one hand, ECHR jurisprudence on property is not
restricted to goals such as facilitating the internal market; being party to the
European Convention entails a more general normative commitment by
members to subject their sovereignty, at least partially, to supranational
standards for the protection of human rights. As such, the development of
supranational property norms guiding state conduct relies directly on the
constitutional-like status the European Convention has achieved. On the other
hand, the fact that the EU Charter is embedded in a broader supranational
structure that includes affirmative EU-level legislation may foster a different
kind of push toward strengthening the common body of property law dealing
with property. But at least as of now, neither venue aspires for full-scale negative
supranationalization of property norms governing state conduct. The margin of
appreciation in ECHR jurisprudence and the corresponding concept of
subsidiarity in the EU context maintain the states' commitment to
supranationalism at an intermediate level in regard to public law property
doctrines.
The big difference that does exist, however, between the European
Convention and the EU lies in the institutional and legal framework for positive
supranationalism in the EU. Accordingly, to the extent that the EU increasingly
aspires to harmonize and not merely coordinate property law among member
states, it would be up to the EU's legislative institutions, subject to the limits on
their competences addressed in Section II, to create a uniform body of law that
would apply to both the private and public aspects of property.

19

Seeid.

74-117.
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IV. PRIVATE LAW PROPERTY DOCTRINES: IN SEARCH
OF HARMONIZATION
This section analyzes the path of supranationalism in the private law
context. Subsection A unfolds the unique challenges involved in any attempt to
converge national private law property doctrines by pointing to both functional
and normative considerations. It argues that, while a functional approach
necessitates a more ambitious attempt at supranational harmonization that
transcends mere coordination, deeply rooted normative considerations underlying private law doctrines may make the task of convergence particularly
difficult. Subsection B then reviews the currently limited scope of actual
harmonization schemes in property law.
A. The Private Law Challenge
There are two particular challenges frustrating the creation of supranational
norms governing the private law aspects of property. First, the in rem nature of
property rights requires that any supranational ordering facilitate a single ranking
of legal powers and priorities with regard to a certain asset, meaning that mere
coordination that leaves intact domestic-level differentiation might not function
well. Second, there is normative complexity in harmonizing national
arrangements of private law property relations that have been traditionally
embedded in local values and culture.
1. The functional dimension: in rem essentiality.
As the structural analysis in Section III demonstrated, property disputes
may implicate indefinite numbers of private parties who have no contractual
privity or other preexisting legal relations yet assert simultaneous or otherwise
conflicting claims to a specific asset. To function properly, a legal system must
identify and prioritize the various kinds of property interests with broad in rem
applicability to all parties concerned. To facilitate such a ranking of powers and
priorities among otherwise distant parties, national property law systems
regularly establish certain formal requirements (such as registration or other
types of publicity), decide whether to grant statutory priority to some property
interests over others, and further constrain the ability of actors to circumvent
property law privately if they wish their rights to prevail against third parties. 20
This in rem essentiality of property rights is the principal functional challenge in
moving to a supranational system of property.

200 See generally SMITs, supra note 117.
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Consider the issue of security interests in movable goods. As the Krantq
decision demonstrates, 201 the fact that two national systems generally recognize
the concept of a reservation-of-tide clause has only limited effect in ensuring
cross-border in rem applicability, at least if the two systems diverge on whether
and how they allow a tax lien to rearrange the ranking of priorities to the asset.
Cross-border coordination-that is, a common recognition of the legal concept
of reservation of title that is nonetheless subject to domestic leeway in defining
the scope of protection, requirements for publicity, or priority vis-i-vis other
types of security interests-may simply not be enough to protect parties'
expectations and reliance interests. The in rem essentiality of property suggests
that a cross-border regime should aspire for harmonization.
National legal systems, even among EU member states, continue to feature
marked differences in the various components of property interests such as
reservation of tide.202 Such divergence exists in relation to the underlying
conceptualization of the property interest (for example, whether a reservation of
title is merely a security interest or genuinely preserves the seller's ownership);
the existence of formal requirements to grant an in rem effect to the right (for
example, whether there is a filing or other publicity requirement); how a certain
type of interest ranks in relation to other types of property interests (for
example, prioritizing contract-created security interests, tax liens, possessory
retention, and the like.); and other features that may have a substantive impact.
Although this problem has been widely recognized, even the EU's
relatively tight form of institutional supranationalism has so far failed to come
up with a harmonized legal order. Thus, for example, the 2000 Directive on later
payments in commercial transactions treats reservation of title in isolation,2 03 as
does the 2000 Regulation on cross-border insolvency proceedings. 204 No
comprehensive scheme has been devised as of yet to create a uniform body of
law.
201 See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
202 See Anna Veneziano, The DCFR Book on Secured 'Transactions:Some Policy Choices Made ly the Working
Group, in TH. FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PROPERTY LAW 123, 125 (Sjef van Erp et al. eds., 2012).
203 See Council Directive 2000/35, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 35 (EC). A prior draft of the Directive that

204

sought to more comprehensively harmonize the law on reservation of tide was rejected due to a
disagreement about the competence of the EU to act in the matter. Moreover, not all member
states accommodated retention of title in their domestic legal order even after the Directive was
introduced. See Bram Akkermans, The European Union Development of European Property Lanp 3-4
(Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2011/30, July 2011), available at
http://ssrn/com/abstract=1888294.
See Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). While most of the Regulation deals
with procedural aspects, it does provide a number of harmonized substantive rules regarding the
validity of retention-of-title provisions (in cases where, at the time of the opening of a national
insolvency proceeding, the asset is located in the territory of another member state). See id. art. 7.
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It should be noted that the 2009 Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR), which focuses mostly on contract law, deals in Book IX with personal
property security rights. 205 It aims at offering a unitary conceptual approach for
different types of security interests and at introducing a common set of rules for
giving an in rem effect to such rights vis-it-vis third parties without entirely
undermining national legal order.206 It remains to be seen whether these
recommended provisions will become law in the EU.
This initiative sharpens a more general discourse about introducing
broader-based harmonized property mechanisms, such as the proposals for a
European Security Right (ESR) in movableS207 or a "Eurohypothec" for real
estate security interests. 208 Without dealing here with other potential benefits of
creating a single system of security rights, such as increasing competition in the
credit market, it is clear that any move toward such an integrated system would
better address the in rem applicability of security rights.
The need for harmonization instead of mere coordination to address the in
rem essentiality of property rights is also apparent in areas of property law other
than security interests. Such is the case with the doctrine of the good faith
purchase of a movable good-stolen or otherwise unlawfully taken from the
owner-that changes hands until it ends up with a buyer who pays consideration
and arguably acts in good faith. The in rem essentiality underlying this garden
variety situation points to one subset of good faith purchases that has been dealt
with quite extensively in the supranational arena: "cultural objects" (which
typically carry a particularly high value for the history or culture of a specific
nation). In addition to rules constructed in national systems, cultural objects
have been the subject of a number of international conventions, including the
1954 Hague Convention,'09 the 1970 UNESCO Convention,2 10 a 1993 EU
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See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODLi, RuL ES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAF-T COMMON

FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), OUTLINE EDITION 447-499 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009),
availableat http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfroutline edition en.pdf.
See Bram Akkermans, The Role of the (D)CFR in the Making of European Propery Law 12-13
(Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2011/29, July 2011), available at
http://ssrn/com/abstract=l 888244.
See Henk J. Snijders, Access to Civil Securities and Free Competition in the EU, A Pleafor One European
Security Right in Movables, in DIVERGENCES OF PROPERTY LAW, AN OBSTACLE TO THE INTERNAL

MARKET? 153, 159-64 (Ulrich Drobnig et al. eds., 2006).
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See Otmar Stocker, The Eurohypothec, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PROPERTY LAW 65 (Sjef van

Erp et al. eds., 2012).
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
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Directive,21 1 and a 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.212 Generally speaking, the
international conventions seek to protect cultural objects by subjecting the
ability to trade or otherwise transfer them to the granting of prior authorization
by the national authority. If the object has already been unlawfully alienated,
including when the final buyer is a good faith purchaser, the various
supranational instruments set up rules that typically provide for the restitution of
the object to the home country, subject to some measure of compensation to
the good faith buyer. While the level of international collaboration in the context
of cultural objects is quite substantial, it falls short of full-scale harmonization,
implicating potential conflicts between interpretations of the various
conventions and vis- i-vis applicable national systems.2 13
But beyond the distinct category of cultural objects-for example, in
standard conflicts between the original owner and a purchaser of a stolen good
that crossed national borders sometime in the process-the property regime
would still be marred by the divergent interpretations of the good faith
purchaser doctrine across national systems. As Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and
Carmine Guerriero show in a recent study of this doctrine across 126 countries,
national legal systems show substantial differences: twenty-nine percent of the
surveyed jurisdictions fully protect the original owner, thirteen percent fully
protect the bona fide purchaser, and fifty-eight percent afford the owner an
intermediate level of protection, typically by restricting the owner's right to
reclaim the stolen good to a term of years (ranging from one to thirty years
across various countries).214
Obviously, to the extent that a cross-border property conflict implicates
two legal systems that embrace opposite positions-with one affording full
protection to the owner and the other categorically favoring the buyer-it stands
in the way of creating a supranational set of private law norms. But even in more
moderate cases of cross-country divergence, such as a private conflict
implicating one legal system that subjects the owner's priority to a one-year limit
in reclaiming the property and a second to a five-year limit, the otherwise distant
parties to the conflict are still faced with the same type of uncertainty. To the
extent that the current supranational regime is one that can be depicted as
settling for "coordination"-meaning that the relevant legal systems share an

211
212

213

214

Council Directive 93/7, 1993 O.J. (L 74) 74 (EEC).
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34
I.L.M. 1330.
See CASEs ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 103, at 1118-29.
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Carmine Guerriero, Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation,
34 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4), available at
www.iuscommune.eu/html/activities/2013/2013-11-28/workshop3_Dari-Mattiacci.pdf.
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underlying concept of preferring the original owner subject to a period of
limitation, but at the same time, each domestic system sets its own time limit or
individually articulates specific features of the good faith requirement-this may
not suffice to facilitate cross-border trade in goods while adequately protecting
property rights of otherwise distant parties. Where the friction caused by legal
diversity is substantial as a matter of practice, the in rem essentiality of property
requires a more ambitious move toward harmonization.
2. The normative dimension: law, values, and culture.
Beyond the functional challenges involved with moving to a supranational
property regime in the private law context, any systematic restructuring of this
field must also address broader-based normative dilemmas. One such concern is
political and moral (that is, value-based) legitimacy. Whereas any switch to a
supranational legal order may implicate such concerns, I suggest that property,
and its private law doctrines in particular, pose a distinct set of legitimacy issues.
A second aspect of the normative challenge derives from the fact that national
private law property doctrines are deeply entrenched in longstanding social and
cultural orientations, so that any attempt to create a harmonized regime must
trickle down to these local grassroots institutions for absorption by the various
heterogeneous crowds to be guided by such new norms. Again, although this
type of challenge may inhere in all types of supranational legal regimes, it is
particularly acute in the context of private law property doctrines, which guide
private conduct by constraining the ability to opt out for private ordering and
requiring a high degree of norm convergence across borders.
In his 1979 book Parliamentfor Europe, David Marquand coined the term
"democratic deficit" to mark the apparent gap between the general commitment
to democratic principles among the then-European Community member states
and the lack of democratically accountable institutions at the European
Community level.215 The issue of whether there is indeed a democratic or
legitimacy deficit in EU lawmaking has since been broadly debated.2 16
Private law matters are far from immune to these afflictions, and in some
ways may even more profoundly implicate them, at least from the citizens'
viewpoint. To the extent, for example, that the EU Charter provides an
215

See DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64-66 (1979).
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For a discussion of this term in the EU context, see generally Christophe Crombez, The Democratic
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additional layer of human rights protection to member states' residents
(including public law property doctrines) or that BIT commitments may raise the
threshold of legal protection for foreign investment (and, indirectly, domestic
investment), citizens may be less adversely affected by lawmaking through nondomestic institutions. In contrast, the establishment of supranational private law
norms affects private actors directly, with the potential incremental benefit to
one group of private actors (for example, sellers protected by a retention-of-title
rule) necessarily adversely impacting another (such as other creditors of the
buyer-debtor, particularly upon insolvency). Property legal norms, the in rem
character of which generally constrains opting out, would thus cabin private
conduct.
The basis of private law norms is not merely formal, but also deeply
embedded in normative considerations as to the underlying choice of values and
social goals. Far from being merely technical or instrumental, private law plays a
key role both in identifying and validating moral values and in constructing
societal and even political institutions. As Martijn Hesselink notes, the making of
private law is one context in which "people may seek their values and ideals to
obtain some legal expression."217
Accordingly, the ECJ's identification of several "general principles of civil
law"-including the binding force of contract, good faith, and unjust
enrichment-must be studied in the broader context of a search for "postnational principles of private law."218 Beyond the issue of formal competences,
questions anise as to whether EU lawmaking institutions should design general
principles of private law rather than promoting ideas of private law pluralism or
political liberalism, especially because the EU may otherwise lack democratic
accountability.'
Must supranational institutions adhere to autonomy as the
inherent essence of private law, such that any other set of values promoted at
the supranational level runs the risk of being considered illegitimate?220 Is the
field of property a particular source of legitimacy concerns because
supranational private law norms, unlike default rules in contract law, do not
allow for effective opting out?

The ties between private law values and sociopolitical construction, and the
resulting normative legitimacy issues, have further dimensions. As Daniela
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Martijn W. Hesselink, Private LIw Prinatiles, Pluralism and Perfectionism, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 21, 22 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds., 2013).
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Caruso notes, private law played a key role in state-making in continental
Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in
Napoleonic France.22 1 The emphasis on private law codification explicitly sought
not only to protect individual freedom and private property, but also to establish
legislative and administrative superiority over courts and other institutions. More
recently, the state-making function of private law has been similarly evident in
post-Soviet countries.222 It also features implicitly in globalization whenever
post-national institutions, under the guise of neutrality and indifference to
power, seek to gain currency through private law discourses. Somewhat
paradoxically, argues Caruso, the powerful rhetoric of neutrality characterizing
private law discourse may accelerate the formulation of highly political global
institutions. 223 And while private parties can empower these institutions when,
for example, they explicitly agree to extraterritorial arbitration in a commercial
contract, they may not have similar power to either decrease or increase the
impact of supranational norms in the property context.
These dilemmas may thus account for the hesitancy of member states to
grant supranational institutions general private lawmaking powers, despite
increasingly yielding to a constitutional-like regime in the public law context. The
ways in which private law may serve as a powerful mechanism for nurturing and
consolidating identity, while enjoying apparent neutrality and lacking
accountability mechanisms present in the public law context, could explain the
careful approach of both member states and their constituents to yielding to an
comprehensive harmonization of private law.224
Current comparative empirical literature supports this analysis of private
law, and the way it accounts for differences among national legal systems-as
deriving from deeply embedded normative considerations-is supported by
current comparative empirical literature. Scholars focus largely on private and
commercial law and explore how national legal systems differ, for example, in
protecting minority shareholders and creditors in business corporations, 225
judicially enforcing debt contracts,226 and constraining landlords' ability to evict
defaulting tenants.227 The differences observed among national legal systems are

221

See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of GlobaliZation, 39 NYU
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Djankov et al., Private Creditin 129 Countries, 84 J. FIN. EcoN. 299 (2007).
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substantial and cannot be explained merely by juxtaposing developed economies
with developing or transitional societies.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer offer a
consolidating theory as to the interrelations between social and political
institutions, legal rules, and financial and economic outcomes of countries.22 8
They argue that what explains differences in private and commercial lawswhich in turn account for disparities in economic and financial outcomes-are
"legal origins" (applying not only to origin countries but also to former colonies
and other countries following these systems), with the English common law,
French civil law, and German civil law constituting the chief "origins." 229
More precisely, the term "legal origins" refers to the ways in which
countries "have developed very different styles of social control of business, and
institutions supporting these styles." 230 Regardless of whether they can be traced
back to medieval or even earlier revolutionary periods, these styles have since
proven quite persistent even in the face of regulatory or legal changes. The
English common law system is said to advocate a general hands-off approach
with only specific interventions by the state. In contrast, the German and French
civil law systems give the state a key role in ordering social and legal relations
and in providing top-down solutions to economic challenges.231
Other writers in this field have focused on even more fundamental and
slow-moving institutions, such as culture.232 Amir Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt,
and Shalom Schwartz offer a classification of culture based on three axes of
value orientations: embeddedness vs. autonomy, hierarchy vs. egalitarianism, and
mastery vs. harmony. 23 3 They study the ways in which these value emphases
interact with key social institutions regulating governance and power: rule of law,
control of corruption, and democratic accountability. They argue that "[s]ocial
norms of governance correlate strongly and systematically with cultural value
dimensions," 234 such that countries with high scores for rule of law, noncorruption, and accountability also score highly on autonomy and egalitarianism.
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Further, such cultural orientations can be seen as the cause of many features of
social institutions.235
In a work coauthored with Licht, 236 I empirically examined the relationship
between the degree of cultural embeddedness/autonomy and property rights,
using a comparative dataset on property rights protection compiled by the
Property Rights Alliance.237 Our analysis found a clear association between the
two variables: the more a country's culture emphasizes embeddedness and deemphasizes autonomy, the less likely it is to protect physical, and especially
intellectual, property rights (in the way the latter are captured by the indices). To
address the issue of causality among the variables, we ran a regression analysis in
which cultural embeddedness emerged as a clear negative explanatory variable
for property rights protection.238
Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero further explore the dependency of private
law property doctrines on cultural attributes in their study of the good faith
purchaser doctrine. 239 They attribute the significant differences among the 126
surveyed countries to a cultural notion of self-reliance, defining it along two
dimensions: regard for hierarchy and emphasis on the individual. 24 0 They view
self-reliant cultures as being characterized by egalitarianism (or a low regard for
hierarchy) and individualism, and find that the corresponding legal systems
exhibit strong owner protection, meaning in this case that the purchaser never
acquires ownership of a stolen good. Consequently, countries with cultures
characterized by low self-reliance strongly protect the buyer, meaning that the
bona fide purchaser of a stolen good immediately acquires ownership. Cultures
with an intermediate level of self-reliance are reported to provide an
intermediate level of protection to the buyer, meaning that the good faith
purchaser acquires ownership only upon the passage of a number of years.241
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While the methodology of these empirical cross-country studies has been
debated,242 it seems safe to conclude that the way in which a certain national
legal system designs its private law property doctrines is neither a technical
matter nor merely the result of different analytical approaches by jurists. To a
considerable degree, these doctrines are embedded in long-lasting cultural
orientations, social perceptions, and political structures. Any significant change
in such doctrines must be initiated, or at the least supported, by the same basic
societal institutions that crafted existing legal norms.243 Accordingly, a
comprehensive attempt at harmonizing private law doctrines must confront how
some underlying national institutions may be less apt for change than others.
Moreover, the underlying local culture and set of values may impact not
only the willingness of domestic institutions to introduce a change in private law
doctrines from the top down, but also the de facto effectiveness of a prospective
legal reform. A number of recent studies point to culture and deeply entrenched
values as crucial factors in the success or failure of private law reforms,
particularly in property law. For example, scholars have attributed the mixed
results and often outright failure of property-related reforms in Russia (in
contexts such as commercial law or condominium governance) to longstanding
cultural features such as lack of interpersonal trust and apathy toward civic
or even to centuries-old theological, social, and aesthetic
engagement,2
24 5 Such potential hindrances to legal reforms, especially to changes
convictions.
driven by a supranational agenda and embedded in values that may be foreign to
the local populace, pose yet another challenge to the harmonization of property

law. 246
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Importance of Being Social 29-37 (January 19, 2012) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/absract=2295974 (identifying social capital-particularly, "technical civic
competence" or the willingness and social capability of tenants in homeowners associations to
exercise effective control over their governing bodies-as a key determinant in the performance
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submission to central authority).
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B. The Current State of Cross-Border Convergence
The above analysis serves to frame the following concise study of the
current status of supranational instruments dealing with private law aspects of
property: theme-specific international conventions, ECHR rulings in essentially
private law matters, and EU legislative attempts at "positive supranationalism."
The private law challenge, although circumscribed by the inherent limits of
harmonization efforts, points to the conclusion that supranational private law
coordination may require an approach different from that of its public law
counterpart.
1. Theme-specific international conventions.
As Section II demonstrated, attempts to create a generally applicable
binding international convention dealing with the right to property have failed so
far, leaving the floor to the development of theme-specific international
conventions.247 Few such conventions or other multi-state instruments have
been adopted, with most concerning only highly distinct types of assets, such as
the 1954 Hague Convention on cultural property (discussed above).2 48 Another
is the 2001 UNIDROIT Convention on Interests in Mobile Equipment, 249
which applies to a limited number of means of transportation such as aircraft
and railroad equipment and establishes an international registry of security
interests-with general applicability across all member states-aimed at
facilitating asset-based financing of such mobile equipment. 250
A notable series of international conventions deals with the creation of
global standards with respect to trusts, estates, wills, and marital property of
persons who cross national boundaries during their lifetime due to work,
retirement, immigration, or other reasons. 25 1 Thus, the 1973 Convention
Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will requires
signatory states to enact into their domestic laws a set of minimal standards
enabling wills drafted and signed in one country to be enforced in other states. 252
Probably the most significant international convention dealing with
property is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
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See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 209, and supra text accompanying notes 209-213.
UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307
U.N.T.S. 342.
See Sprankling, supranote 129, at 479-80.
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Rights (TRIPS).253 The evolution and content of TRIPS obviously cannot be
surveyed here, but two points are of particular relevance. First, as a matter of
political feasibility and institutional organization, it seems clear that TRIPS
would not have been signed and ratified by 158 countries had the intellectual
property commitments not been inherently tied to the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the requirement that all states who wish
to join the WTO sign the TRIPS agreement as well as submit to the WTO's
dispute resolution mechanisms.254 TRIPS is thus highly exceptional in its ability
to create a comprehensive supranational framework in a private law field
(intellectual property) by relying on the establishment of reciprocal public law
commitments in the fields of trade regulation and tariffs. 2ss
Second, there is disagreement as to whether TRIPS essentially created a
single supranational code that brings about harmonization of intellectual
property law, or whether it should be viewed rather as having created a less
stringent framework, one located between coordination and harmonization.
Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, who subscribe to the latter
viewpoint, portray TRIPS as having created a neofederalist structure that "gives
states substantial latitude to tailor their law to the circumstances of their creative
sectors, to deal with local distributive concerns, and to further policy preferences
orthogonal to the intellectual property system."256 Without resolving this
controversy here, I should note that, to the extent TRIPS allows for substantive
local flexibility in going beyond mere implementation measures, such latitude
would undermine the feasibility of a system in which creators of innovative
information, market competitors, and end-users across borders would be
governed by a single set of norms, ranking powers, and priorities to intellectual
products.
The Supreme Court of India's 2013 decision in Novaris v. Union of India..
offers key insights about the limited scope of such harmonization in the postTRIPS era. India's 1970 Patents Act originally excluded the possibility of
patenting "substances intended for use . . . as food or as medicine or drug." 258
To conform to TRIPS, India amended its Patents Act effective as of 2005 to
253
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299,33 I.L.M. 1197.
For a discussion of different narratives regarding the formation of TRIPS-including a "coercion
narrative"-see GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERAIST VISION
OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 32-39
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delete this section. At the same time, the amended Act limited patentability only
to drugs created after 1995 and subject to additional constraints, particularly
those enumerated in Sections 2(ja) and 3(d) of the Act, which condition the
patentability of a "new product" on "technical advance as compared to ...
existing knowledge" and on "enhancement of the known efficacy."2 59 Gleevec,
Novartis's original drug for leukemia treatment, was developed in the early
1990s and was thus not patentable in India. In 1998, Novartis filed an
application for a beta version of the drug, arguing it was a "new" and "superior"
version, entitled to be registered as a patent.260
Recounting the Act's evolution, the Court reasoned that the underlying
rationale of the 1970 Act was one that viewed English colonial patent laws as
doing "little good to the people of the country" and serving mostly the interests
of foreigners, especially in the context of food and medicine that are "vital to the
health of the community" and "must be available at reasonable prices."261
Analyzing the Act and the subsequent development of the pharmaceutical
industry in India, the Court expounded the position of India and other
developing countries during and following the negotiations on TRIPS, including
those leading to the 2001 Doha Declaration.262 It identified concern that
overbroad patent protection might "put[] life-saving medicines beyond the reach
of a very large section of people."2 63 The Indian legislature, "while harmonizing
the patent law in the country with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement,
strove to balance its obligations under the international treaty and its
commitment to protect and promote public health considerations."2 64 Finally,
the Court held that Novartis did not convincingly demonstrate the required
"enhanced efficacy."2 65
The Novartis decision thus demonstrates how underlying moral and social
perceptions are bound to impact private law doctrines over time, even in the
case of a relatively thick supranational framework such as TRIPS, and how
domestic societal values (to the extent that they are adequately identified and
represented by lawmakers) pose normative challenges to globalization. The
explanation for these disparities cannot be reduced only to opportunism or
power plays among national governments in their sovereign capacity. Whether
259
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260
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such normative gaps can be narrowed over time so as to facilitate true legal
harmonization is a puzzle, but distinct from the mere existence of global
technology or markets.
2. The European Convention of Human Rights and private disputes.
How has the ECHR responded to petitions alleging a breach of Article 1
of the First Protocol of the Convention in essentially private law disputes? In
such settings, the plaintiff challenges the underlying legislative or judicial legal
regime regulating private relations as a disproportionate violation of its property
rights. As this subsection shows, the ECHR's overall approach has been to apply
the general tests of proportionality and fair balance and highlight the need for
procedural adequacy, while at the same time opting for a particularly broad
margin of appreciation and refraining from pushing toward substantive
uniformity in the private law of property.
One such example is the 2007 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal case.266 The
petitioner, a U.S. corporation, sought to have its trademark "Budweiser"
registered in Portugal's registry of industrial property. Its application was initially
approved for registration but later denied following an objection by a Czech
brewery, Budvar, which argued that it was exclusively entitled to make use of
Budweiser's commercial name. Portugal's Supreme Court had held in favor of
Budvar, in light also of the provisions of a 1986 BIT between Portugal and thenCzechoslovakia.267 The ECHR determined that Article 1 of the First Protocol
applied to intellectual property and that the petitioner could be viewed as
owning a set of property rights linked to its application for registration,
especially because the original application had been submitted in 1981 but the
BIT signed only in 1986.268
The Court observed that "even in cases involving litigation between
individuals and companies, the obligations of the State under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 entail the taking of measures necessary to protect the right of
property" and that "the State is under an obligation to afford the parties to the
dispute judicial procedures which offer the necessary procedural guarantees and
therefore enable the domestic courts and tribunals to adjudicate effectively and
fairly in light of the applicable law."269 At the same time, it stressed that "its
jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been correctly interpreted and
applied is limited and that is not [the Court's] function to take the place of the
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267
268

See id.
See id.

269

Id.T 83.

available at

12-24.
66-78.

512

2Vol 15 No. 2

Lehavi

Strategies to GlobaliZe Property

national courts, its role being rather to ensure that the decisions of these courts
are not flawed by arbitrariness or otherwise manifestly unreasonable."27 0
Accordingly, the Court held that the national court's decision could not be
viewed as arbitrary or unreasonable: "[c]onfronted with the conflicting
arguments of two private parties concerning the right to use the name
'Budweiser' . . . the Supreme Court reached its decision on the basis of the
material it considered relevant and sufficient for the resolution of the dispute,
after hearing representations from the interested parties." 27'
Probably the most prominent ECHR case to date on an essentially private
law property dispute is J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. UnitedKingdom.272 Concisely stated,
the case dealt with adverse possession of registered private land. The applicants,
the land's former owners who had lost their case before the national courts,
argued that the then-in-force English adverse possession law, the Land
Registration Act of 1925,273 violated Article 1 of the First Protocol.274 The
ECHR's Section 4 Chamber ruled that the case did implicate the first paragraph
of Article 1 and that, although English adverse possession law may be deemed as
serving a genuine public interest, the interference with the registered owners'
rights was disproportionate and thus in violation of Article 1 ."
The Grand Chamber reversed. While resorting to the general tests of fair
balance and proportionality, it noted that "the margin of appreciation available
to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide
one" and that this deferential approach is "particularly true in cases such as the
present one where what is at stake is a long-standing and complex area of law
which regulates private-law matters between individuals."27 6 Moreover, the
Grand Chamber held that "[i]t is a characteristic of property that different
countries regulate its use and transfer in a variety of ways. The relevant rules
reflect social policies against the background of the local conception of the
importance and role of property. "277
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In the 2009 Zehentner v. Austria.. case, the ECHR focused on the general
obligation of the state to "afford the parties to the dispute judicial procedures
which offer the necessary procedural guarantees," holding that an Austrian law's
procedures for the judicial sale of the applicant's home did not sufficiently
account for her illness and lack of legal capacity.27 9
Finally, in the 2012 Lindheim v. Nonvaf" decision, the Court reviewed a
2004 amendment to the Ground Lease Act of 1975 that subjected the leasing of
lands for permanent homes or holiday homes to special statutory regulation,
entitling lessees to demand an unlimited extension of the contracts on the same
conditions as applied previously upon the expiration of the lease's agreed
term."' The ECHR reiterated its previous case law, by which "the margin of
appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic
policies should be a wide one" such that the Court will respect the domestic
legislative judgment as to what is in the public or general interest "unless that
judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation."282 It held, however, that
the statutory intervention in lease contracts, even if looking to address the
growing pressure on real estate prices in Norway, placed its social and financial
burden solely on the applicant lessors, thus not striking a "fair balance between
the general interest of the community and the property rights of the
applicants."2 83
As these cases indicate, the ECHR has been particularly careful when
interfacing with private law doctrines, instead granting domestic legislatures and
courts a wide margin of appreciation in defining both the ends and the means
that have been set forth against the background of the local conception of the
role of property. The Court thus places particular weight on the idea of
subsidiarity and avoids attempts at converging substantive national property
doctrines. By contrast, it finds more room to intervene through its general
doctrines of fair balance and proportionality in matters relating to the procedural
adequacy of legislative or judicial actions. It has also generally intensified its
supranational standards of property protection in reviewing legislative reforms
driven by social justice or other redistributive considerations, such as in James v.
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United Kingdor?84 or the Lindheim case. This intensification is especially evident
when the ECHR examines whether the burdens entailed by the means chosen
fall solely or inordinately on one of the parties-perhaps viewing such reform
schemes as closer to the public law end of property. But as far as quintessential
private law disputes are concerned, the Court is far from trying to introduce a
harmonized system of property law through the Convention's property clause.
3. The European Union and the limits of positive supranationalism.
As Section II argued, although the EU is evidently the most
comprehensive supranational framework in existence today, the "positive
supranationalism" of private law is far from wide-ranging. A few fields, such as
consumer law, are seeing mixed results, with some theme-specific provisions
(such as distance contracts) legislated at the EU level attaining at least a certain
degree of convergence, but most other topics are still dominated by national
lawmaking.285 Private law aspects of property have been dealt with even more
rarely in EU regulations, directives, and decisions. This is so not only in light of
general questions of EU lawmaking competence discussed in Section II, but also
because of practical difficulties in devising a harmonized set of in rem property
norms.
Current property-related EU legislation includes: the directive on cultural
property;286 a directive on late payments addressing the issue of retention of title
but allowing for national divergence by not setting EU standards; and
regulations on insolvency proceedings that provide only few substantive rules on
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priority.28 As pointed out in Section IV, more ambitious efforts to design an
EU-level single system of security rights, such as a European Security Right in
movables or a Eurohypothec for real estate,2 88 have so far not come to fruition.
The very essentiality of a single set of property norms and a supporting
integrated mechanism for publicizing and affecting such rights is also the source
of the challenge. To be effective, a system governing one or more of the private
law aspects of property must often aspire to substantive and institutional
harmonization. A fragmented system of coordination may not suffice even
within the EU.
This rationale seems to have guided the EU Parliament's December 2012
decision to approve the "EU patent package" of a unitary patent, language, and
court regime. The unitary patent system seeks to create a genuine harmonization
scheme, one that not only provides a single set of substantive legal provisions
and patent registration mechanisms, but also establishes a single court that will
have sole jurisdiction in deciding patent disputes.
As a final note, the formal harmonization efforts of property law within the
EU should be evaluated against the massive investment by EU academic and
professional institutions to create a common ground for EU private law. The
2009 DCFR, sponsored by the Joint Network of European Private Law, 28 9
serves not only as an intellectual endeavor. Alongside its potential to set up
principles and model provisions for future EU legislation, DCFR and similar
initiatives seem to aim at a much more ambitious goal: creating a common
framework that could over time trickle down to the underlying societal
institutions and cultural values of the member states. Time will tell whether this
ambitious goal will be achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
The globalization of property poses a series of challenges that cannot be
attributed merely to an inadequate or conservative legal response to bottom-up
social and economic forces. While the cross-border nature of markets for capital,
goods, services, and labor creates pressure for a supranational institutional
platform, slow-changing domestic societal institutions that play a key role in
shaping interpersonal legal relations must follow their own course in moving
from a local to a global system of governance. At times, top-down frameworks
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such as BITs or the EU may work to facilitate such a grassroots shift, but its
results-especially in private law-may be more complex than anticipated.
As a field of law, property has a complex and unique structure that may
also be instrumental in illuminating the broader prospects of legal globalization.
The fact that public law and private law doctrines may allow for different
strategies and diverging levels of supranational ordering along the
coordination/harmonization continuum vividly illustrates that globalization is
not likely to follow a single course. In particular, attempts at globalizing the
private law aspects of property face functional and normative challenges that
may take much time and effort to overcome. The essentiality of grassroots
processes of cultural and social change, advocated and often idealized by many
proponents of globalization, mandates caution in assessing the future trajectory
of strong-form supranationalism in property law.

Winter 2015

517

